Doctrine Corner

by Mr. Richard Garza

ATP 2-19.4,

Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Techniques: The Update

Introduction

It is vital that the U.S. Army maintain readiness by being manned, trained, and equipped to respond to the most significant readiness requirement, conducting large-scale ground combat operations against a peer threat. ATP 2-19.4, *Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Techniques*, is the Army's doctrinal publication describing those techniques that the brigade combat team's (BCT) intelligence warfighting function uses when providing intelligence support to BCT operations. The techniques described in this publication, published 25 June 2021, apply across the Army strategic roles, with an emphasis on large-scale ground combat at echelons brigade and below within the infantry, armored, and Stryker BCTs. Intelligence Soldiers are highly encouraged to use the baseline information contained in ATP 2-19.4 while tailoring it to their specific unit and mission.

ATP 2-19.4 focuses on large-scale ground combat operations that require the BCT intelligence warfighting function to conduct intelligence operations continuously in order to provide commanders and staffs with detailed knowledge of threat strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, equipment, capabilities, and tactics. This information enables commanders to plan for and execute operations.

In order to ensure successful operations, BCT commanders require intelligence about the enemy and other conditions of the operational environment (OE). Intelligence assists commanders in the tasks of visualizing the OE, organizing forces, and executing operations to achieve the desired tactical objectives or end state. As an element of visualizing the OE, intelligence supports the commander by providing situational understanding of the threat and predicting possible threat courses of action. In regard to the most significant readiness requirement, Army forces must strike a peer threat unexpectedly in multiple domains and from multiple directions, denying freedom of maneuver by creating multiple dilemmas that the enemy commander cannot effectively address.

The information contained in ATP 2-19.4 provides the doctrinal duties and responsibilities of the BCT intelligence



Figure 1. Integrating Intelligence into the Operations Process

warfighting function and describes the intelligence process within the context of the operations process (Figure 1). The goal of the ATP 2-19.4 update is to empower those intelligence Soldiers with the knowledge necessary to provide effective intelligence support to the BCT.

A New Focus

The Army updated its foundational doctrine to reset the focus on large-scale ground combat operations against a peer threat. This shift in Army doctrine, as well as updates to BCT intelligence capabilities, organizations, and structure, was the main driving force behind the update to this Army techniques publication. In order to maintain consistency with validated Army doctrine, ATP 2-19.4 covers—

- BCT intelligence support to the warfighter through the Army's strategic roles.
- BCT intelligence support to the operations process.
- Updated verbiage to ensure consistency with operations and intelligence doctrine and terminology.
- BCT intelligence considerations such as training; predeployment preparation; BCT intelligence architecture and the related topic of primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (known as PACE) planning; collection management; and targeting.

The update to ATP 2-19.4 contains seven chapters and four appendices outlined below:

- **Chapter 1** overviews the Army's operational concept of unified land operations and the OE. It also provides an overview of the BCT's intelligence warfighting function and its support to the operations process.
- **Chapter 2** describes the roles, functions, and structures of BCT intelligence organizations.
- **Chapter 3** discusses BCT intelligence techniques during the plan and prepare activities of the operations process.
- **Chapter 4** discusses BCT intelligence techniques during the execute and assess activities of the operations process.
- **Chapter 5** details BCT intelligence during competition below armed conflict.
- **Chapter 6** details BCT intelligence during prevail in large-scale ground combat operations in addition to challenges and mitigations during this Army strategic role.
- **Chapter 7** discusses BCT intelligence during operations to consolidate gains.
- **Appendix A** discusses intelligence training, the Military Intelligence Training Strategy (MITS), and the intent and execution of each tier within the MITS certification.
- **Appendix B** describes techniques for predeployment preparation and training of intelligence Soldiers.
- **Appendix C** discusses the intelligence architecture and communications networks.
- **Appendix D** overviews intelligence support to targeting for BCTs.

ATP 2-19.4 was last published in 2015. This update describes doctrinal techniques and force redesigns that include new capabilities, organizations, and structures of brigade and below intelligence elements as well as the latest concept of operation for the BCT's military intelligence (MI) company. The MI company is designed to support the various requirements placed on the infantry, armored, and Stryker BCTs. The update to ATP 2-19.4 removes old constructs such as the company intelligence support team and multifunctional platoon, as well as other items that were necessary in facilitating successful counterinsurgency operations. These old constructs are replace by new concepts designed to help the BCT in large-scale ground combat operations.

The Army techniques publication update now includes force design revisions that resulted from the 2016 MI Bottom Up Review (BUR) conducted by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) and the Army G-2. During this BUR, USAICoE and the Army G-2 analyzed MI capabilities across the Army's three components through the lens of competing against peer threats and the multi-domain operations concept. The review validated the following requirements:

- Rapid detection, identification, and dissemination of threat high-payoff targets are essential to the timely targeting required to dis-integrate threat antiaccess and area denial.
- Realignment of the internal MI company structure is required to enable the MI company to support BCT operations in multiple domains.

The doctrinal techniques and force design updates contained in ATP 2-19.4 address how the MI company and BCT intelligence elements meet the challenges of multi-domain operations and the information environment. Figure 2(on the next page) shows the new structure of the MI company.

A significant aspect of meeting the challenges of multi-domain operations and the information environment is the integration of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic



Figure 2. New Structure of the Military Intelligence Company

warfare teams with oversight by the reintroduction of technical control and analysis cells. SIGINT shares close linkages with, and provides much of the foundational intelligence to enable, cyberspace, electromagnetic warfare, and information operations. The ATP 2-19.4 update describes the purpose of integrating electromagnetic warfare with SIGINT—providing complementary capabilities that can result in the following:

- Recommendations of advantageous terrain for the employment of SIGINT and electromagnetic warfare assets. This is essential to obtain an unobstructed line of sight to suspected enemy emitters.
- Communications and non-communications emitter mapping across the electromagnetic spectrum for the commander.
- Options to disrupt enemy signals for the commander.

Other Key Additions

ATP 2-19.4 begins by explaining foundational concepts that intelligence Soldiers should comprehend in order to understand how they fit into the bigger Army picture and why their roles are vital to BCT operations. These basic concepts include an explanation of the BCT, the Army's operational concept of unified land operations, the OE, the Army's strategic roles, decisive actions, and the BCT's intelligence warfighting function. Also included is a description of how the intelligence warfighting function supports the operations process through the intelligence process. These concepts provide the framework that readers need to progress through the rest of ATP 2-19.4.

In order to help reader understanding, recent intelligence publications have included a tailored graphic displaying a logic map with an overview of the key concepts and processes. It also shows how these pieces fit together. In the same light as these recent publications, ATP 2-19.4 also provides a graphical logic map in the first chapter (Figure 3, on the next page). The purpose of this graphic is to show where BCT intelligence elements fit and how BCT intelligence elements collaborate with higher-level organizations. In order to maintain consistency throughout the other echelon publications, this same graphic style will also be used in the other intelligence echelon publications, such as ATP 2-19.1, *Echelons Above Corps Intelligence Organizations*, and ATP 2-19.3, *Corps and Division Intelligence Techniques*. The purpose of having this graphical logic chart in the echelon publications is to ensure a common thread exists among them, with each emphasizing the unique aspects of intelligence support at that echelon.

Other key additions to ATP 2-19.4 support the most significant readiness requirement. These additions include the various challenges facing the BCT intelligence warfighting function during large-scale ground combat operations. Challenges discussed in the Army techniques publication that are summarized in the following paragraphs include—

- Intelligence-on-the-move.
- Maneuverable intelligence nodes.
- Degraded information environments.
- PACE planning.

Intelligence-on-the-Move

ATP 2-19.4 introduces intelligence-on-the-move and its potential effect on intelligence operations. Fighting for intelligence during large-scale ground combat operations



--------	operational control
ABCT	armored brigade combat team
ARCYBER	United States Army Cyber Command
ARNG	Army National Guard
ASCC	Army Service component command
BCT	brigade combat team
BN	battalion
CCMD	combatant command
CCOE	United States Army Cyber Center of Excellence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DA G-2	Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOS	Department of State
E-MI	expeditionary-military intelligence
E-MIB	expeditionary-military intelligence brigade
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FORSCOM	United States Army Forces Command
GEOINT	geospatial intelligence
GS	general support
HUMINT	human intelligence
IBCT	infantry brigade combat team
IEW	intelligence and electronic warfare
INSCOM	United States Army Intelligence and Security Command
IOC	Information Operations Command
MI	military intelligence
MIB	military intelligence brigade
MIB-T	military intelligence brigade-theater
MIRC	United States Army Military Intelligence Readiness Command
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NSA/CSS	National Security Agency/Central Security Service
ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SBCT	Stryker brigade combat team
SIGINT	signals intelligence
TRADOC	United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
USAICOE	United States Army Intelligence Center of Excellence
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USCYBERCOM	United States Cyber Command
USDT	Department of the Treasury

Figure 3. BCT Intelligence Collaboration with Higher-Level Organizations

relies on the effective synchronization of the intelligence warfighting function. Effective synchronization must begin early in the planning process and be continually assessed throughout all phases of an operation. Understanding *when* and *how* intelligence handovers will occur with subordinate, adjacent, and higher echelons is essential for intelligence staffs to ensure there are no gaps in the intelligence process as they maneuver with the unit.

The BCT intelligence cell must be flexible and resilient to meet the demands of the maneuver units in its organization. The cell must be prepared for constant movement and displacement, while maintaining its battle rhythm and processes. Synchronizing intelligence efforts through constant communications with other intelligence units while continually maneuvering through a battlefield during large-scale ground combat may be the key to maintaining situational understanding.

Maneuverable Intelligence Nodes

Mission variables, known as METT–TC, determine command post (CP) displacement (commonly referred to as jumping tactical operations center). As explained in ATP 2-19.4, units will require frequent CP movements during large-scale ground combat operations because of the high operational tempo, risk mitigation measures, and other factors. Displacements can be both planned and unplanned; therefore, CPs must maintain a readiness posture to displace on short notice. When CPs must displace, notable impacts arise from incomplete access to information because of diminished communications capabilities with which to disseminate information and intelligence.

Standard operating procedures covering all aspects of displacement will assist in maintaining a state of readiness. Critical aspects of command and control (C2), such as contact with higher headquarters and subordinate units, must be maintained during displacement. Intelligence staffs must ensure they prepare their specific displacement plan to align with the supported CP's plan. This will facilitate near-seamless transitions when displacing and provide continuity of intelligence support during large-scale ground combat operations.

After a unit establishes its CP, it enables different types of connectivity, including network access at different classification levels, detailed and nested digital common operational pictures, supported intelligence systems, and fully connected intelligence elements at echelon, such as an intelligence support team or the brigade intelligence support element. Establishing a robust intelligence architecture should not limit the ability to move it quickly. Intelligence staffs accomplish rapid displacements through detailed planning and preparation and by executing deliberate intelligence handovers between the assorted CPs to provide continuity until the architecture is reestablished.

Degraded Information Environments

Just as the commander considers the impact of degraded information environments on C2 systems, the S-2 considers the impact on intelligence operations and systems. ATP 2-19.4 describes degraded information environments and mitigation methods. Intelligence networks may be degraded for various reasons, such as hostile actions to contest the freedom of maneuver in the cyberspace domain and the information environment or because of a lack of resources for sufficient network coverage in an area of operations. The degradation may not be technological in nature, but rather environmental. The possible use of nuclear weapons or adverse weather may create physical conditions that cause electromagnetic spectrum interferences or degraded intelligence networks. All these factors may interfere with the BCT intelligence warfighting function's ability to conduct intelligence operations.

As explained in ATP 2-19.4, to mitigate this risk and successfully conduct intelligence operations in degraded information environments, staffs cannot rely solely on technological capabilities. S-2s should ensure their personnel receive training on analog and manual processes and are comfortable operating in degraded information environments. Ultimately, the solution to operating in degraded information environments is C2. Despite severely degraded conditions, Army forces continue to make decisions and act in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities arise.

Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency Planning

Intelligence staffs should plan to maintain constant communications throughout operations and should do this through a tailored communications plan, commonly known as a PACE plan. ATP 2-19.4 explains in detail how S-2s should collaborate with S-6s to establish the intelligence architecture in order to determine an efficient communications plan. This plan should be codified in a C2 standard operating procedure and Annex H (Signal). S-2s should also ensure each intelligence discipline and element develops a detailed PACE plan to promote continuous communications, information collection, and intelligence operations. A PACE plan establishes the various communications methods and channels, typically from higher to lower echelons, but it should also consider lateral communications. The PACE concept is

a valuable tool that ensures the availability of backup communication channels if the primary channel fails.

As mentioned in ATP 2-19.4, some OEs are more permissive and have a mature information infrastructure, allowing communications and products to flow relatively freely across mediums such as SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) email or SharePoint. In these circumstances, a PACE plan is still necessary because email servers and SharePoint experience outages. S-2s will benefit from a PACE plan in mature communications environments, even if the plan uses different aspects of the same medium (unit SharePoint, email, third-party SIPRNET SharePoint). The update to ATP 2-19.4 provides several example PACE plans that intelligence Soldiers can use as a reference when planning for communication continuity for their units.

Collection Management

ATP 2-19.4 and ATP 2-01, *Collection Management* (formerly known as *Plan Requirements and Assess Collection*), were developed concurrently; therefore, careful coordination ensured these publications would complement each other. The new ATP 2-19.4 provides explanations of collection management from the BCT perspective and includes updated terms and definitions, and features the updated collection management process (Figure 4).

ATP 2-19.4 states that collection management contributes to the overall information collection plan. The publication also states that, in intelligence usage, "*collection management* is the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results, and retasking, as required."[1] (See ATP 2-01 for a detailed discussion on collection management.) Although a collection management team does not currently exist within the MI company or BCT S-2 structure, the BCT S-2 must establish a dedicated collection management team in order to successfully conduct the processes of collection management and appropriately coordinate with the current operations cell, plans cell, and targeting cell.



COA course of action MDMP military decision-making process PIR priority intelligence requirement

Figure 4. Collection Management Process

Spotlight on Intelligence Architecture Appendix

Digital Intelligence Systems Master Gunner Course (DISMGC) and Information Collection Planners Course personnel assisted in rebuilding the intelligence architecture appendix. Collaboration with DISMGC personnel led to the creation of a Microsoft Teams group with the goal of bringing together intelligence architecture subject matter experts from across the force. This Microsoft Teams group is still active with more than 150 members and guests. The group helped update the intelligence architecture appendix and are currently assisting with the update to MI Pub 2-01.2, *Intelligence Architecture*. This effort demonstrated that using a collaboration software platform could be a potential best practice for future publication developmental efforts.

DISMGC is a partnered endeavor among U.S Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Army National Guard, and USAICoE to train intelligence leaders to plan, develop, and integrate dynamic digital structures using the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS–A) family of systems within complex environments. As the DCGS–A is the Army's intelligence program of record, the update to ATP 2-19.4 contains multiple references to the DCGS–A family of systems. The 2015 version of ATP 2-19.4 contained no such references, making these updates a welcome addition to the revised Army techniques publication.

The new BCT intelligence architecture appendix provides the necessary information that BCT intelligence Soldiers require to understand the basic components of an intelligence architecture, which consists of the

source, processor, output, and transport methodology. This methodology, along with the provided examples and explanations, should assist BCT intelligence Soldiers in having a better understanding of the foundations for establishing an intelligence architecture.

Spotlight on Intelligence Training Appendix

ATP 2-19.4 now features MITS, first introduced in 2019. MITS is an intelligence-centric certification event designed to train individuals, crews, and platforms to accurately answer intelligence requirements for the commander and certify respective intelligence disciplines in a field environment. MITS is a standardized certification strategy for commanders to plan training before certifying their tactical intelligence warfighting capabilities in an objective and quantifiable manner.

While there have been many attempts to address intelligence training deficiencies, there was no standardization across the force and no process to ensure certification of intelligence military occupational specialty-specific Critical Task Lists. Without standardization, the intelligence warfighting function lost the ability to have an intelligence professional able to perform their intelligence duties, moving between tactical and strategic level units. To create a standard for MITS, USAICoE developed tasks that applied across the force that would be transferable and translatable across any formation. ATP 2-19.4 describes MITS, the associated tier levels, and the training circulars that provide the in-depth information that BCT MI leaders can leverage and cross-reference to ensure the readiness of the BCT intelligence warfighting function.

Spotlight on Targeting for BCTs Appendix

The targeting appendix includes the most up-to-date intelligence support to targeting information tailored for the BCT level. It was developed by targeting subject matter experts on USAICoE's doctrine writing team who are responsible for completing various intelligence support to targeting projects. The team has been involved in providing the intelligence-specific portions to FM 3-60, The Targeting Process, which is under development. In addition, the intelligence support to targeting writing team is developing a new publication titled ATP 2-01.4, *Intelligence Support to Army Targeting*. Collaboration ensured that ATP 2-19.4 would be relevant and complementary to both Army targeting publications in current production.

The update to ATP 2-19.4 includes refinements to the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) Army targeting methodology and provides the key intelligence tasks to support targeting:

- Perform intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
- Provide intelligence support to target selection and target development.
- Provide intelligence support to target detection.
- Provide intelligence support to combat assessment.

The targeting appendix explains how the Army targeting process organizes the efforts of the commander and staff to accomplish key targeting requirements (Figure 5). The D3A process assists the commander and staff in deciding which targets must be acquired and engaged and in developing options to engage those targets.



Figure 5. The Military Decision-Making Process and Army Targeting Process

Conclusion

The goal of the ATP 2-19.4 writing team was to produce the best possible doctrine publication for the force—one that contains timely and relevant information despite the changing work environment the team encountered during the coronavirus disease 2019. This endeavor entailed incorporating best practices and lessons learned, leveraging USAICoE's pool of local subject matter experts, reaching

out to the intelligence community, and integrating a collaboration software platform into the workflow process.

Additionally, the initial and final drafts of ATP 2-19.4 were staffed worldwide and received approximately 600 combined comments as a result. These comments were adjudicated, and the draft publication subsequently underwent multiple senior leadership reviews. The writing team also ensured that the publication would synchronize with other draft publications such as ATP 2-01, *Collection Management*, and ATP 2-01.4, *Intelligence Support to Targeting*, along with the recently published TC 2-19.01, *Military Intelligence (MI) Company and Platoon Reference Guide*, and FM 3-96, *Brigade Combat Team*.

The USAICoE Doctrine Division counts on intelligence professionals like you to provide feedback on doctrinal issues. If you need doctrinal assistance or have important feedback, please contact the Doctrine Division at usarmy.huachuca.icoe.mbx.doctrine@mail.mil.

Endnote

1. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2-0, *Joint Intelligence* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 22 October 2013), I-13 (emphasis added).