



## *Building Indirect Lethality in Army Reserve Military Intelligence Tactical Teams*

A U.S. Army Reserve Soldier with the 259<sup>th</sup> Military Intelligence Brigade walks to the brigade tactical operations center during exercise Always Engaged 18 at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), WA, July 12, 2018. Exercise Always Engaged is a multicomponent military intelligence exercise conducted at JBLM.

---

by Colonel Rose Keravuori, Colonel Jackie East, Captain Matthew Thomas,  
and First Lieutenant Fernando Bendana

---

### **Introduction**

U.S. Army Reserve military intelligence (MI) tactical teams enable indirect lethality through their support to lethal and nonlethal fires at echelons ranging from division to battalion task forces. In an expeditionary-military intelligence battalion (E-MIBn), MI tactical teams include human intelligence collection teams; counterintelligence teams; operational management teams; signals intelligence teams; cryptologic support teams; multifunctional teams; and processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) teams consisting of several intelligence disciplines. These teams focus on supporting lethality to enable maneuver commanders to dominate in their tactical tasks. The specific challenges that reserve MI tactical teams face are—

- ◆ Supporting the achievement of lethality in the available 38 training days (2 days of battle assemblies per month and 14 days of annual training allocated in one fiscal year).
- ◆ Obtaining results with geographically distributed and non-proximate resources.
- ◆ Increasing indirect lethality in the absence of organic subject matter expertise.

Solutions to some of these problems include focusing on team-level training, purposefully creating the right operational environment, making deliberate use of U.S. Army mission training complexes (MTCs), and using cadre from the Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISC).

### **Focus on Team-Based Training**

Team-based training, assessment, evaluation, and eventual certification are the goals for reserve component MI tactical teams. It is best to focus training at the team level, rather than at the company or battalion levels, because of the normal turnover of personnel, civilian job constraints, commitments to professional military education, and other factors Soldiers face in today's Army Reserve.

### Measures of Collective Task Proficiency<sup>1</sup>

- T : fully trained (complete task proficiency)
- T- : trained (advanced task proficiency)
- P : practiced (basic task proficiency)
- P- : marginally practiced (limited task proficiency)
- U : untrained (cannot perform the task)

Increasing indirect lethality to at least the practiced level (P level) of collective task proficiency,<sup>2</sup> based on ADP 7-0, *Training*, and the *Leader's Guide to Objective Assessment of Training Proficiency*,<sup>3</sup> requires a straightforward training management operation that is based on the intelligence team concept of the Military Intelligence Training Strategy. A unit's training management should include the following focus areas:

- ◆ Training, assessments, and evaluations conducted at night during battle assemblies, given the proper operational environment.
- ◆ Integrated training, assessments, and evaluations across intelligence disciplines for teams using a mix of live, virtual, or constructive domains.
- ◆ Team-level training and prevention of over-investment in individual military occupational specialty (MOS)-related training, especially training that simply re-creates institutional training.
- ◆ Use of available collective training resources during long battle assemblies and annual training.
- ◆ Aggregation of trained and ready teams at the section, platoon, and company level.
- ◆ Guidance from ADP 7-0 and the *Leader's Guide to Objective Assessment of Training Proficiency* to generate external evaluations by adjacent and echelons two levels higher.<sup>4</sup>

No field manual precisely defines the concept of intelligence teams; therefore, teams should be multifunctional and sized appropriately to execute a certain intelligence role and function. The mission essential tasks' and the supporting collective tasks' training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) indicate the echelon required for the evaluation of performance steps and measures. Consideration must be given to discrete teams. For example, imagery teams consisting of one geospatial intelligence imagery analyst (MOS 35G) and one all-source intelligence analyst (MOS 35F) can be capable of PED for one full motion video line for one shift. Reviews of the T&EOs relevant to such a team revealed that an MOS 35F-qualified all-source intelligence analyst is not necessary for this team to achieve an outcome

rating of "fully trained," indicated as T, or even a rating of "practiced," indicated as P. The role of the all-source intelligence analyst on this team is to generate a spot report; a size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) report; and other reports in coordination with the geospatial intelligence imagery analyst to enable rapid targeting and effects assessment. The person performing this function must maintain logs, write a post mission report, and be able to match identified items with high-payoff target lists. This person must also receive queuing information from other intelligence functions, be able to understand priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) well enough to identify information that may assist in answering commander's critical information requirements, and then bring that information to the attention of the officer in charge or the noncommissioned officer in charge. Although being a graduate of the initial entry MOS 35F granting course may make achieving a "GO" in these performance measures easier, most of these are common Soldier tasks that anyone can be trained to accomplish. A review of relevant T&EOs can identify performance steps and measures that non-MOS-qualified Soldiers are qualified to accomplish in their position.

Further, these discrete teams do not necessarily have to perform steps and measures with other intelligence functions assessed within the collective task or mission essential task. However, integrating their training does enhance the value and make assessment and evaluation simpler. AR 220-1, *Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies*, and the *Leader's Guide to Objective Assessment of Training Proficiency* contain information that allows the aggregation of multiple teams of the same type into one higher echelon T-rating. Assessors and evaluators can also aggregate multiple types of team ratings to generate ratings for a mission essential task that have performance steps and measures for multiple types of teams.

### The Right Operational Environment

Creating the proper operational environment helps achieve indirect lethality, given the limited training days available to reserve Soldiers. Innovating battle assemblies for better training, including night training, allows the highest possible assessment and evaluation outcomes at a low cost. The following analysis compares night operations battle assembly with day battle assembly (Figure 1, on the next page). This sample training schedule has sufficient night operations at low residual risk and enables the use of contract lodging in kind as well as sustenance in kind. Figure 2, also on the next page, shows a comparison of a night operations battle assembly versus a day battle assembly.

### Night Operation Battle Assembly/Drills

SATURDAY						SUNDAY		
0930-1100 (1.5 hrs)	0930-1130 (2 hrs)	1130-1200 (.5 hrs)	1200-1800 (6 hrs)	1800-1900 (1 hr)	1900-2359 (5 hrs)	0000-0100 (1 hr)	0100-0200 (1 hr)	
APFT-Select-Pax	Leader Workgroup	Soldiers Report Formation	Operations	Dinner-SIK	Operations	Operations	Leader Workgroup	
SUNDAY								
0100-1000 (9 hrs) (7 hrs leaders)	0900-1000 (1 hr)	1000-1100 (1 hr)	1000-1100 (1 hr)	1100-1130 (.5 hrs)	1200-1300 (1 hr)	1300-1600 (3 hrs)	1600-1630 (.5 hrs)	1630-1800 (1.5 hrs)
Warrior Rest Management	Leader Check-out LIK	Leader Workgroup	Soldiers Check-out LIK	Soldiers Report Formation	Lunch-SIK	Operations	Soldier Release Formation	DTMS

### Day Operation Drills

SATURDAY								
0630-0800 (1.5 hrs)	0700-0800 (1 hr)	0800-0830 (.5 hrs)	0830-1130 (3 hrs)	1130-1230 (1 hr)	1230-1700 (4.5 hrs)	1730-1930 (2.5 hrs)	1700-2359 (7 hrs) (4.5 hrs leaders)	
APFT-Select-Pax	Leader Workgroup	Soldiers Report Formation	Operations	Lunch-SIK	Operations	Leader Workgroup	Warrior Rest Management	
SUNDAY								
0000-0700 (7 hrs) (6 hrs leaders)	0600-0700 (1 hr)	0700-0800 (1 hr)	0800-0830 (.5 hrs)	0830-1130 (3 hrs)	1130-1230 (1 hr)	1230-1600 (4.5 hrs)	1600-1630 (.5 hrs)	1630-1800 (1.5 hrs)
Warrior Rest Management	Leader Check-out LIK	Leader Workgroup	Soldiers Report Formation	Operations	Lunch-SIK	Operations	Soldier Release Formation	DTMS

Figure 1. Sample Drill Weekend Training Schedules

Figure by COL Keravuori

Both approaches have 15 operational hours. Day operations allow a small addition to available leader training management hours and moderately more transition time for leaders and Soldiers. The day schedule generates much more transition time overnight between Saturday and Sunday operations.

An approach to providing balance among P-level and higher assessments and evaluations involves using a model of a one-night battle assembly at home station, one field training exercise battle assembly away from home station at a location with available supporting infrastructure, and one typical daytime battle assembly at home station. This revised time structure maximizes available time for opera-

tions, transition, and training management and best manages residual risk from reduced transition time during night battle assembly operations.

In addition to innovating battle assemblies, using an appropriate set of operational and mission variables will allow teams to meet the highest possible operational environment level that the T&EOs require for the mission essential task or supporting collective task. Operational variables such as time, infrastructure, information, and physical environments can be created, leveraged, and manipulated to achieve outcomes. Constructive, live, and virtual mission variables challenge and stress intelligence teams when conducting training, assessments, and evaluations.

NIGHT		DAY	
Night Leader Training Management	Night Soldier Training Management	Day Leader Training Management	Day Soldier Training Management
5.5 Hours	1.5 Hours	6 Hours	1.5 Hours
Leader Operations	Soldier Operations	Leader Operations	Soldier Operations
15 Hours	15 Hours	15 Hours	15 Hours
Leader Transition	Soldier Transition	Leader Transition	Soldier Transition
11.5 Hours	13.5 Hours	15 Hours	15 Hours
Leader Total Hours	Soldier Total Hours	Leader Total Hours	Soldier Total Hours
32 Hours + 1.5 for APFT Days at BA/Drill	30 Hours + 1.5 for APFT Days at BA/Drill	36 Hours + 1.5 for APFT Days at BA/Drill	31.5 Hours + 1.5 for APFT Days at BA/Drill

Figure 2. Night Battle Assembly versus Day Battle Assembly Comparison

Figure by COL Keravuori




Figure 3. Army Mission Training Complexes

### Army Mission Training Complexes

With most Army Reserve centers geographically distributed and often in remote locations, leaders must make use of Army MTCs. MTCs are located at all military installations with a division or corps headquarters and are available for reserve unit use. The Army Reserve has five mission training complexes that also have an Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer (IEWTPT) capability. Figure 3 shows the Army MTC and IEWTPT locations in the center of the green circles. The circles represent approximately 8 to 10 hours of tactical vehicle driving from the center point to the circumference edge of the circle.

The MTCs possess many critical capabilities for tactical MI units to increase their support to lethality. These centers can establish command post-like organization and hardware that units can use. They can also simulate the mission command systems via the Warfighters Simulation (WARSIM) system. This is the same simulation system division and corps headquarters use to create virtual combat and sustainment operations for warfighter exercises. MTCs can replicate full motion video and produce automatically generated signals intelligence reporting for PED. These facilities can set up and network mission command systems such as Command Post of the Future (CPOF), Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A), and Tactical Ground Intelligence Stations to enable integrated training outcomes. Finally, MTCs will allow MI systems maintainers/integrators (MOS 35T) to do their performance steps and measures.

As an example, at the MTC at Fort Stewart, Georgia, the 321<sup>st</sup> E-MIBn had access to a virtual battlefield and live equipment in a facility designed to resemble a division

analysis and control element (ACE). The battalion's imagery intelligence analysts and signals intelligence analysts received full motion video, moving target indicator, and signals intelligence tactical reports to process, exploit, and disseminate in real time, while the battalion's intelligence operations and assessment team synchronized collection against division PIRs as provided by the exercise director. The E-MIBn was able to constructively feed reports and combat

information to stimulate human intelligence and counter-intelligence operational management teams. The MTC network had a voice and text chat capability that allowed the E-MIBn to provide targeting, battle damage assessment, queuing, fusion, and real-time modification of collection planning.

The costs for leveraging MTCs to increase support to lethality are minimal. Units must plan and prepare with the MTC to achieve better outcomes. This includes providing concept of exercise, staffing, digital account rosters, mission command system requirements, blue and white cell WARSIM operators, Multiple Unified Simulation Environment operators, and refresh training on DCGS-A and CPOF. This also allows time for the exercise white cell to prepare necessary division and ACE products to enable the MI unit being trained to execute its mission essential tasks.

In the Fort Stewart MTC example, the 321<sup>st</sup> E-MIBn invested 16 hours of coordination and planning time with the MTC and used 4 hours of digital training refresh. The 321<sup>st</sup> E-MIBn also provided a seven-person guard detail for 24-hour guard coverage over 10 days, 10 Soldiers for 4 days to train on WARSIM and the other enabling systems for fires and information collection at the MTC, and one Soldier for 4 days to prepare division and ACE CPOF products to enable the exercise. The military installation offered barracks and access to a dining facility during the event. The unit required 8 hours to conduct a tactical convoy operation over 230 miles to the MTC event and then another 8 hours back to home station. This investment enabled a 3-day training event that provided more than 24 hours of assessment and evaluation. The event replicated a U.S. division attacking

three enemy divisions in the defense, and it replicated full motion video, moving target indicator, and signals intelligence for PED. The event also allowed intelligence operations and assessment to execute their tasks, and stimulated operational management teams using a large-scale ground combat operation. The E-MIBn was able to generate P-ratings for each relevant mission essential task and supporting collective task evaluated.<sup>5</sup>

### Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers

The ARISCs give reserve units access to classified training spaces, intelligence architecture, and certified intelligence discipline observer coach/trainers (OC/Ts). The ARISCs have collectively more than 200,000 square feet of training and classified workspace provisioned with the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network, Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network, National Security Agency Network, and field support engineers provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Military Intelligence Readiness Command. Five ARISCs are located across the United States (shown in Figure 4) with additional detachment locations, including Phoenix, Arizona; Orlando, Florida; Fort Devens, Massachusetts; and Dekalb, Maryland. Each ARISC has the mission to enable and facilitate MI reserve readiness. The ARISCs offer credentialed trainers, nationally aligned curricula, and access to Army program of record systems to enhance measured MI reserve team readiness in order to provide deployable, trained, equipped, and connected teams capable of meeting the mission requirements of combatant commanders and the national to tactical intelligence community.

The five main ARISCs are also Army Foundry sites. They can provide a certified intelligence discipline cadre across all intelligence disciplines. Each of the OC/Ts assigned to the ARISC has completed a certification program for their particular intelligence discipline. This seasoned cadre is available to train MI teams throughout the U.S. Army Reserve and is capable of supporting an external evaluation during scheduled unit training time, including battle assemblies and annual training exercises. First Army active duty Soldiers are also assigned to each ARISC and function as part of the cadre. MI company commanders consult the ARISC cadre to develop their company unit training plans and refine them regularly. As part of the planning process, MI company commanders take into consideration their mission essential task list, the mission they are training toward, a current assessment of their intelligence teams, the available time to train, and a desired end state. The ARISC cadre then helps the company command teams to develop tiered training strategies for all intelligence disciplines in alignment with the Military Intelligence Training Strategy and assists with the development of a realistic, executable training plan. ARISC personnel can also provide primary or assistant instructor support either at the ARISC site or with a mobile training team.

### Conclusion

For reserve MI tactical formations, the focus continues to be on ready and deployable teams. As a reserve E-MIBn, the 321<sup>st</sup> has focused on conducting team-based training; innovating battle assemblies; and optimizing the use of MTCs, IEWTPTs, and ARISCs to increase team readiness, employability, and deployability. The future of MI teams

will shift to better support the deep-sensing capability that division and corps commanders need in large-scale ground combat operations. Reserve MI tactical teams must innovate to continue to improve their teams' indirect lethality. ✨

#### Endnotes

1. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 7-0, *Training* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 31 July 2019), 4-2.
2. See ADP 7-0, *Training; Leader's Guide to Objective Assessment of*




Figure 4. Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers

Figure provided by COL Keravoori

Training Proficiency; and relevant training and evaluation outline report collective task forms.

3. The *Leader's Guide to Objective Assessment of Training Proficiency* is one of several tools for unit leaders to navigate through the instructions and procedures to plan, prepare, execute, and assess training. It is accessible to unit commanders and Soldiers through the Army Training Network at [https://atn.army.mil/dsp\\_template.aspx?dplD-376](https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dplD-376) (common access card login required).

4. External evaluations can be achieved in one of three ways in accordance with ADP 7-0 and the *Leader's Guide to Objective Assessment of Training Proficiency*. First, two levels higher can evaluate mission essential tasks. For teams and platoons, this means the battalion commander and staff can evaluate; for companies, the brigade commander and staff can execute the evaluation. Second, these same documents also allow adjacent units to conduct external evaluations; for example, a sister platoon can observe,

coach, and train a platoon and provide an external evaluation. Third, there are organizations and units outside the military intelligence (MI) tactical team's chain of command that could provide an external evaluation. These include other reserve component or active component MI units, the cadre of the Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers, First Army observer coach/trainers, and the 84<sup>th</sup> training command observer coach/trainers. With only 38 days of available potential training and assessment time, leaders must leverage all available collective training resources and innovate to generate T ratings.

5. Of critical importance in building indirect lethality is the documentation of assessments and evaluations in the Digital Training Management System and the retention of sufficient documentation to give First Army and your higher headquarters confidence to execute post-mobilization validation/certification.

*COL Rose Keravuori is a U.S. Army Reserve officer currently serving in the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve G-3/5/7. She previously commanded the 259<sup>th</sup> Expeditionary-Military Intelligence Brigade. She has deployed in an intelligence capacity to Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. COL Keravuori holds degrees from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, University of Oxford, and Army War College.*

*COL Jackie East is a U.S. Army Reserve officer who serves as the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, 84<sup>th</sup> Training Command, Fort Knox, KY. He previously commanded the 321<sup>st</sup> Expeditionary-Military Intelligence Battalion. He holds a master of arts in diplomacy and international commerce and a doctorate in public policy and research methods from the University of Kentucky, a master of arts in operational art and science from the School of Advanced Military Studies, and a master of arts in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College.*

*CPT Matthew Thomas is a U.S. Army Reserve officer currently serving with the 321<sup>st</sup> Expeditionary-Military Intelligence Battalion in Orlando, FL. He is a counterintelligence and all-source intelligence officer with multiple deployments to the Middle East. In his civilian capacity, he works as an analyst for Army Futures Command. CPT Thomas holds a bachelor of science in international relations from the University of Central Florida.*

*1LT Fernando Bendana is a U.S. Army Reserve Officer who serves as platoon leader in Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 321<sup>st</sup> Expeditionary-Military Intelligence Battalion. He holds a bachelor of science in computer engineering.*

The Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) training team from the 304<sup>th</sup> MI Battalion has created a page on SIPRNET Intellipedia. The page has links to many materials that supplement the platform instructions the team gives on DCGS-A software at USAICoE. Among the things you'll find on the page are:

- Step-by-Step Instructions on how to perform the ArcGIS tasks (basic and advanced), which the team covers in its DCGS-A instruction.
- A collection of useful documents on DCGS-A architecture.
- Descriptions of DOD and Intelligence Community data sources, whose data can be imported to/analyzed in DCGS-A software. For example, NGA's Net-centered Geospatial Delivery System (NGDS) is a web portal that carries current satellite and airborne imagery segments. DCGS-A users can use NGDS to find current images of their AO, and then download chips of those images into ArcMap and the Multifunction Workstation's (MFWS) 2D Map. The result---an image "layer," which can be overlaid over background maps/CIB imagery, to give a more current and high resolution view of the terrain and facilities in your AO.

To access our page, go to SIPRNET Intellipedia and search for "304<sup>th</sup> DCGS-A Training Team." Our contact information is on the page; please give us your feedback.