Military Intelligence

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LINGUISTICS

VANTAGE POINT

Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr.

These are extraordinary times which are going to dramatically change our Army, our Corps and the way we collectively do business. We are clearly going to be a smaller Army and a smaller Military Intelligence Corps. However, that does not necessarily mean that either will be any less capable. In fact, I would argue that we stand to be even more capable, and significantly so, if we can optimize the employment of the new Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) systems we will be fielding starting this year and continuing into the next decade.

When we developed the first iteration of the Army Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Target Acquisition Master Plan (AIMP) in 1987, we ensured it did four things:

1. Captured the IEW and target acquisition requirements of commanders at every echelon from maneuver battalion through echelon above corps, including the timeliness and accuracy of the data they required — this was the most exhaustive effort ever done to capture commanders' requirements.

2. Considered all technological advancements that were anticipated that could leverage our capabilities and provide quantifiable combat value added.

3. Defined system capabilities that would incorporate the most promising technology and enable us to satisfy identified commanders' requirements.

4. Be fully coordinated throughout the Army so that the Army had ownership in our design for the future.

This approach has paid major dividends because we are now on the verge of fielding the systems defined in the AIMP. As you know, last year the AIMP was translated into the Army IEW Modernization Plan by DCSINT and DCSOPS, DA, with our support. The IEW Modernization Plan presented such compelling arguments for the flagship systems defined in the AIMP, that the Army leadership resourced all of them in this year's Army Program Objective Memorandum so that they would all be fielded over the course of this decade.

The systems I am talking about include the Imagery Processing and Dissemination System (IPDS); the Tactical Radar Correlator (TRAC); the Tactical High Mobility Terminal (THMT); GUARDRAIL Common Sensor (GRCS); the UAV-Short and UAV-Close Range; Ground-based Common Sensor (GBCS) (heavy and light versions); Advanced QUICKFIX (formerly known as Aerial Common Sensor-Division); the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS); and the Joint Surveillance, Target Attack, Radar System (JSTARS) Ground Station Module (GSM).

These systems will provide capabilities that will revolutionize the way we do business in Military Intelligence and, as a direct consequence, the way we fight as an Army. In fact, we are working with the Commander, TRADOC and the commanders of all the other TRADOC Centers and Schools to revise AirLand Battle Future Doctrine to take advantage of the enormous advances in intelligence and targeting capabilities these new systems will provide and, at the same time, address technological advances in other functional areas, the changing nature of the world's geopolitical situation, and anticipated changes in the nature of future warfare.

For our new warfighting doctrine to be successful, we must ensure we do our part in optimizing the employment of the new capabilities we will be fielding. Smart, effective collection management will be critical to our success. Clearly, just as focusing and leveraging combat power is the key to victory in combat, focusing and synchronizing intelligence collection is essential to optimizing the employment and contributions of our systems. Every MI professional must know how to do collection management well, and we must put well qualified personnel into the collection management and dissemination (CM&D) sections at every echelon. Obviously, at brigade and battalion this burden falls directly on the S2's shoulders, and they will have to be equally familiar with how to do collection management or reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning.

To facilitate this training, we are publishing an updated version of Field Manual 34-2, *Intelligence Collection Management* and a new manual, Field Manual 34-2-1, *Reconnaissance and Surveillance Planning*. These manuals will be

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Command Sergeant Major David P. Klehn

On July 6, 1990, the Military Intelligence Corps installed Command Sergeant Major (retired) Louis H. Rothenstein as the new Honorary Sergeant Major of the Corps. Rothenstein has the kind of background that will allow him to speak for the Corps and communicate with our troops. He was initially trained and served as an infantryman. He has had numerous tours as an Intelligence Sergeant and Analyst in Korea, Germany and Berlin, and he had two tours in Vietnam as an advisor. He has been a First Sergeant and a battalion, brigade and MACOM Command Sergeant Major. He was a chief instructor at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy and knows the kinds of problems soldiers are and will be facing. He can provide solutions. I know he will have no hesitation in helping the Chief, Honorary Colonel and me in carrying out our responsibilities.

For the past three years, Command Sergeant Major (retired) George W. Howell, Jr. has served as our Honorary Sergeant Major of the MI Corps. When it came time to select the first Honorary Sergeant Major, Howell was the only choice. With 30 years of service he rose from private to Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. He had duty with the field artillery, airborne, special forces and, especially, with MI units in CONUS and OCONUS. Sure, this gave him operational and technical experience but, more importantly, it exposed him to every kind of soldier we had in our Army over those 30 years — and still, in large measure, have today. That's the kind of man we needed and got as our first Honorary Sergeant Major — a man who knew soldiers and was most comfortable when he was with them. As Honorary Sergeant Major that's what he has done. His travels to be with our soldiers have taken him to Forts Bragg, Lewis, Stewart and Meade. The list goes on and on. The MI Corps, and more importantly our soldiers, thank CSM George Howell.

I have been the CSM of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School and the Sergeant Major of the MI Corps for over 18 months. I have been able to meet many of the students who have passed through our gates. I have spoken to all of the BNCOC and ANCOC classes here at Fort Huachuca. In these 18 months, I have visited the MI soldiers at the 6th Infantry Division and 106th MI Battalion, Fort Richardson, Alaska; Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe; the 66th, 205th, 207th, and 701st MI Brigades in Europe; the 102d MI Battalion and 501st MI Brigade in Korea; the 500th MI Brigade in Japan; the 125th MI Battalion and 703d MI Brigade in Hawaii; the 504th MI Brigade at Fort Hood, Texas; the 112th MI Brigade (TNG) at Fort Devens; the 3d Battalion, 112th MI Brigade at Goodfellow AFB, Texas; and the Pensacola Detachment, Corey Station, Fla. I have been impressed with the professionalism and dedication shown by all the soldiers I met. Our nation and the U.S. Army cannot preserve our freedom without their contribution. I have been able to discuss the future with them and give them some hints for career development. They have given me their perspectives and their ideas on what we need to do to improve our MI Corps. I hope to be invited to other units to continue this interchange.

The U.S. Army is entering into a decade of change. We know we will get smaller, our force structure will change, we will have less money to operate with, and our national strategy will change. There is fear that comes with change. There are many rumors circulating concerning these changes. **We have to be careful about these rumors**. If we repeat a rumor, we have to make certain that the listeners understand **it is a rumor**.

We have to be careful when we read the headlines in newspapers. They are sometimes misleading. I recently saw the headline "Most U.S. Forces To Leave Seoul by 1996." My first reaction was to think that we were pulling out most of our troops in Korea. What the article went on to say was that most of the U.S. forces that were in Seoul would relocate to other locations in Korea. A lot of rumors start this way. We see a headline but don't read the rest of the story.

The Chief of Staff of the Army has decided to eliminate the Skill Qualification Test (SQT). The SQT for privates, privates first class and specialists/corporals will be eliminated at the end of the current test cycle, November 30, 1990 and for the

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FROM THE EDITOR

Foreign language fluency is one of MI's critical technical needs. Unfortunately, it's a hard skill to obtain, and once a soldier is fluent in a foreign language, the skill is highly perishable if the soldier doesn't use the language often. What can we as leaders do to train our linguists and keep them trained, especially with REDTRAIN and other funds drying up? Fort Lewis has some answers for us, and these are featured in this issue. I'm also including an article on machine translation (MT). The author suggests that the Army could narrow the linguist gap by sometimes using computers to translate instead of people. He makes some interesting points. You won't want to skip that one, especially if you're a linguist!

I told you I'd get away from the theme format for MIPB, and you'll see that this issue features quite a variety of topics. For example, you'll find two articles that give interesting views of the current nature of the Soviet threat. History buffs can also read about the career of Major General Ralph Van Deman, the "father of MI." Also, you can find some good lessons learned from the 511th MI Battalion's support of the 12th Panzer Division during CENTURION SHIELD '90.

I hope you enjoyed the last issue. Our Art Director Dutch Poggemeyer has taken the bulletin away from its former "cartoon look," (as many of you called it in the survey).

Many of you have submitted articles recently, and your efforts are greatly appreciated! Unfortunately, I've had to reject some, so I thought it might be helpful to go over again what it is we're looking for. Articles need to be written in a clear, easily understandable style. They should be interesting and offer valuable information to as wide an audience as possible — officers, NCOs, junior enlisted soldiers and MI civilians. Don't oversimplify your topic; assume the reader has a good basic knowledge of MI doctrine. The biggest problems I've encountered are as follows:

- The author tries to cover too much information in too little space. The article winds up being too general, and in the end, the author hasn't said much.

- The article is simply a public affairs piece that doesn't offer anything for discussion or provide lessons learned. It's okay to write about your unit, as long as your purpose is to teach others something your unit has learned or experienced. I'm not allowed to publish public affairs items.

- The author gives opinions that aren't backed up by sources or examples. It's okay to send me something that is just your opinion, but it should be addressed as a letter to the editor.

If I reject your article for any reason, I'll let you know. If you send us something and haven't heard back in over a month, you might want to give us a call. Remember, if we do use your article, you might not see it appear for quite a few months, since this is a quarterly magazine. I DO appreciate your articles, even if I can't always use them. I'd still like to hear from more NCOs.....

Last, but definitely not least, thanks and welcome to our new subscribers! Quite a few of you have joined us this quarter, and we appreciate it!

Sincerely,

LETTERS

Dear Editor:

The recent article, "Pioneer Spirit," published in the April-June 1990 issue of **Military Intelligence** contains some inaccuracies which need to be corrected.

The author writes on page 30, that the Army has chosen the Pioneer UAV system to be taken into battle. This implies future procurement of Pioneer systems are to be forthcoming. This is totally in error. Congress has specifically prohibited further purchases of the Pioneer system for any service's use. The Army's only Pioneer system is fielded to develop doctrine and employment concepts and to train cadre for future tests of the Short Range UAV system currently under contract. The only combat function envisaged for the Pioneer system is a very limited contingency capability pending fielding of the Short Range UAV system commencing in FY 94.

Also on page 30, the author says the Pioneer system only lands on a runway. In fact, the Navy regularly performs net recoveries on the battleships as mentioned later in the article.

The section "What The Pioneer Can do for the Combat Arms," implies that more Pioneer systems will be available for the various combat arms units. This is not correct. Identification of the planned fielding of the Joint Short Range UAV systems is more correct.

The section, "Pioneer vs. Aquila" on page 31 implies the Aquila can record data while in autonomous flight. This also, is incorrect. While the Aquila can perform autonomous navigation, it cannot record data while in autonomous mode of flight. This capability is intended for survivability enhancing use of terrain. Pioneer can do autonomous station keeping flight operations and limited waypoint to waypoint navigation.

The "UAV Fielding This Year" paragraph on page 31 says the Pioneer is to be integrated into Army operations. This implies more than it should. Only *one* Pioneer system will be purchased. Furthermore, it implies no testing will be conducted on the Short Range UAV systems currently under contract. Early operational testing commences at Fort Huachuca July 1991 and technical testing commences March 1991 for the Short Range UAV downselection process.

Colonel Paul K. Tanguay
TRADOC System Manager,
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Dear Editor:

I read with dismay the article by Colonel Joseph M. Blair III, "Warfighting and Intelligence in the 21st Century: Promote the Best Officers," (April-June 1990 issue). It is obvious that he believes the best MI Officers are involved in tactical intelligence. While, thankfully, most soldiers spend the majority of their time getting ready to fight, there are many MI officers and men who are engaged with the enemy on a daily basis whether or not there is an actual tactical situation. There are a significant number of MI officers who collect, analyze and process intelligence as attaches, intelligence group personnel located outside CONUS, members of SIGINT units, and those assigned to other agencies. Most of these jobs have nothing to do with being a commander, operations officer, S2, S3 or XO. These soldiers are not training, they are involved in an ongoing peacetime war to ensure that our country is not caught by surprise. Promotion boards typically have one MI Branch officer as a member. If that MI officer doesn't understand real-world intelligence, non-tactical oriented officers who make up the other MI specialities have no representation on the board. Statistics from recent Army Officer Promotion Boards bear ample evidence to the fact that those MI officers who work the real-world human intelligence problem on a daily basis have experienced a significantly lower promotion selection opportunity. Tactical intelligence training is necessary, but during peacetime there are large numbers of MI officers who don't fit the promotion board matrix. Why should MI officer OERs be written to look like the OER of an Infantry officer who is busy getting ready to fight while the MI officer is, in fact, fully engaged with the enemy? For many of us there is no peace dividend.

I commend Robert B. Davis for his article, "Changing Roles

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

DCSINT-VIEWS FROM THE TOP

by Lieutenant General
Charles B. Eichelberger
Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence

We are publishing this message sent by General Eichelberger in May 1990. His words are important to all members of the MI Corps.

I have been the DCSINT now for over seven months, and the job has been as challenging and exciting as I expected. The changing world situation and the proposed reduction of the Army present the MI community with some tough issues to work. The purpose of my message is to let you know what I am thinking regarding the challenges and issues that we will face in the coming months.

I am told there is a perception that intelligence support to the tactical army is not always the best and that some combat arms leaders have lost confidence in MI. This should not be true, but perceptions are important. With the shortage of MI captains and majors, we have difficulty in filling brigade and maneuver battalion S2 positions with fully qualified officers. No doubt this has influenced how we are viewed by the combat arms. Major General Menoher, Commander, USAICS, has already corresponded with you on this matter, but it is of such great importance that I wanted to reinforce his message.

"Company command remains the major discriminator for selection to attend resident CGSC."

Often the first real experience our future senior leaders have with MI is when they command a battalion or brigade and have an S2 on their staff. Whether or not that S2 is able to demonstrate tactical and technical proficiency and get the job done despite adversity, has a lasting impression on battalion, brigade and division commanders. Thus, we do the branch a disservice when we ask our lieutenants to compete with experienced majors or senior captains on a battalion staff. Most of our lieutenants, although very fine officers, simply do not have the training or experience to gain the complete confidence of the commander. I realize that we do not have enough qualified officers to go around, but the corps and division G2s must closely monitor and influence the distribution of MI captains and majors to ensure that maneuver battalion S2 positions are filled with branch qualified captains. At times this means "biting the bullet" and going short on the corps or division staff or in the MI brigade or battalion, but shortages can best be absorbed at those levels rather than at one-of-a-kind, one deep, S2 positions. Therefore, I solicit your help in placing majors or experienced captains in brigade S2 positions and captains in all maneuver battalion positions. I know that cuts you short in other areas, but the trade-off is worth it in the long run. Further, I am told by PERSCOM that we will have more captains available in the future. Some division G2s have already filled most of the maneuver battalion S2 positions with captains, and I applaud that effort. Unfortunately, others of you have not and the branch suffers as a result. We must manage our major and captain shortages better for the good of the branch.

As I travel around to visit units and meet with people here in Washington, I'm often asked, "what must I do to be successful?" That is a difficult question that I'll try to answer, but let me state up front, there are no major formulas. First and foremost, you must seek the tough jobs and you must do them well. Since you have little control over what you do as a lieutenant and many of our officers join the branch as captains, I'll focus my comments on possible career patterns from captain through lieutenant colonel. As captains graduate from the Advanced Course and haven't previously served in the tactical Army, they should seek an assignment at division or corps. If you read my previous paragraph, you know that I believe that every MI officer should aspire to be an S2 at battalion or brigade, or both. I know of no better learning environment for honing your technical skills and enhancing your basic leadership skills. Also, many of our company command opportunities are found in division and corps MI units. You must seek company command at every opportunity.

Company command remains the major discriminator for selection to attend resident CGSC. Battalion or higher level staff presents additional professional development opportunities for junior officers. Since about half of the assignments available at most grades are EAC, your next assignment will likely be to INSCOM or joint or to a high level staff. Most of you know that MI Branch is paying a big bill in staffing joint requirements. Each of you at field grade level can expect a joint assignment at some time. Just because these aren't tactical doesn't make them any less important, so accept these jobs, work hard and grow professionally. I strongly support a good tactical-strategic mix of assignment and professional development for all officers. One shouldn't get in either a tactical or strategic track and remain there for a prolonged period. As captains you will be asked to make key decisions regarding specialized programs such as the foreign area officer or program manager career tracks.

"I strongly support a good tactical-strategic mix of assignment and professional development for all officers."

Some of you will be selected to serve in the Army's new acquisition corps. You should accept that challenge with enthusiasm and a view toward program management of IEW systems to improve MI Branch capabilities for the future. Although the command/operations track is the traditional path to colonel, other functionally oriented career programs provide excellent opportunities for full, satisfying and enjoyable careers. In fact, I intend to work hard to ensure that our FAOs and PMs along with other specialty programs remain competitive for promotion to colonel. If you are pursuing the traditional track, you need to get back with troops as a major for some S3 or XO time. This will maximize your chances for battalion command or a G2 position and subsequent promotion. Nothing all that revolutionary here. The key is hard work and quality performance in the tough jobs.

"The MI Branch will take a fair share of cuts, but MI will not be the bill payer for other branches."

I know that many of you are concerned about the personnel reductions facing the Army and MI

Branch. That is understandable, but let me assure you that all is not doom and gloom. The exact number of MI personnel reductions over the next few years is still undecided, but current projections put the Army strength at about 140 thousand below current levels by 1994. The MI Branch will take a fair share of cuts, but MI will not be the bill payer for other branches. In fact, the Army leadership strongly supports a robust intelligence capability for the future. We will be a smaller branch, but highly trained, ready and more capable. My optimism stems in part from the strong position that we currently enjoy in the budget process. The CSA has supported our budget request for FY 92-97, which contains a plus-up to support early fielding for some of our critical systems. Additionally, if we manage the personnel reductions wisely, we can eliminate some of our persistent shortages in key specialties, particularly those requiring a language. Already, we are planning for the reallocation of people and equipment to increase readiness and enhance our capability to support a broad range of tactical and strategic missions. Therefore, I do not believe there will be any need to reduce substantially the number of MI professionals. Since we have shortages now, we will manage toward elimination of shortfalls and allow attrition to take care of necessary reductions. The CSA is doing everything possible to avoid a RIF for officers and NCOs. Promotions will decrease proportionally as we transition to a smaller force, but the percentage of officers and NCOs selected for promotion to the next higher grade will remain about the same. Bottom line is that MI will have greater challenges and accountability in the future, but we will have a fully capable and ready force to meet those challenges.

"We are doing our people a great disservice when we let OERs get into the file that are not well understood by most board members."

While I'm addressing personnel related matters, let me say a few words on officer evaluation reports. After every board, I receive the same backbrief, i.e., that as a branch we do a lousy job of establishing appropriate job titles, preparing job descriptions and writing OERs that are easily understood by all board members, especially the non-MI representatives. We are doing our people a great disservice when we let OERs get into the file that are not well understood by most board members. I want to solicit the help of our senior people, especially commanders, to ensure that only clearly written reports get into the file. Also, as senior leaders we must ensure that our rating profiles convey to the selection boards a clear message. The senior rater block continues to be the most important part of the OER for the selection process. So don't lose your vote. A young lieutenant or even junior captain may not know what constitutes a good job title or appropriate job description. They must be trained to recognize these things, as well as what constitutes a good, fair or adverse report. Commanders and senior supervisors must accept responsibility for training junior officers and for providing a quality check on the system. Every commander or senior leader should review the reports prepared in his organization to ensure compliance with accepted standards. The job title and job description must be in terms that are understood by all board members. The evaluation report remains the single most important document in our files. It must create a positive image as opposed to being a distracter, if we want our people to be competitive.

"Commanders and senior supervisors must accept responsibility for training junior officers and for providing a quality check on the system."

I will try to visit all of you during my tour as the DCSINT, but in the meantime I must rely on written communications to share my thoughts on subjects of importance. I'll use the G2 notes and other mechanisms to convey information and on occasion I'll send out a message such as this that focuses on specific issues. For example, I'll address items of interest to our warrant officers and noncommissioned officers in the next iteration of "DCSINT Views From The Top." I request you give this information the widest dissemination and to provide feedback as appropriate. Send message traffic to HQDA, DAMI-ZX or talk directly with my XO, Colonel Byron Dean at AV 227-9475/2298.

NARROWING THE LINGUIST GAP

By Colonel Wesley A. Groesbeck

In June 1988, U.S. Army Forces Central Command (USARCENT), the Army component to U.S. Central Command, completed a major study to determine its total linguist requirement to support its primary operations plan. The study indicated that a wide gap existed between the number of linguists required to conduct the mission and the number of linguists actually on-hand.[1] To correct the situation, several initiatives were examined. One of them, which USARCENT has since adopted on a test basis, is machine translation (MT). MT uses computers to translate from one language to another. Besides having the capability to reduce USARCENT's linguist gap, it is envisioned that MT will also play a significant role across the spectrum of the USARCENT staff in enhancing its coalition warfare operations. USARCENT sees MT as a combat force multiplier of the 21st century which should be considered now for use by the rest of the Army

History of MT

The idea of having a computer do translation work has been around for at least 30 years. The initial impetus for MT resulted from Sputnik. Encouraged by new developments in computer technology, pioneers of the 1950s began to look to MT to provide a breakthrough in the high-speed processing of foreign scientific and technical literature. The early MT systems had their faults — they were not too flexible, and the results were questionable. For example, one early computer translation of the phrase, "the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak" from English into Russian resulted in "the vodka is good but the meat is rotten."

Today, MT systems, relying upon a mainframe computer, are capable of translating 60,000 words per hour with an accuracy level (depending on the document) of 65 to 90 percent before post-editing.[2] Currently, input is still manual, since, contrary to popular belief, existing optical character recognition systems, especially with Arabic or

Russian alphabets, do not work well enough to be reliable. The best available MT systems today still require human translators to do extensive post-editing. Therefore, MT will not replace human translators in the near future. It will, however, reduce the work involved in human translation by approximately 66 percent. MT also allows non-translators to determine quickly the content and the importance of a particular document and what documents should be translated in full, etc., thus saving time and bringing important information to light expeditiously.

There are now some MT systems being developed that do not rely upon a mainframe computer for translation but have a stand-alone capability on a personal computer (PC). This allows for an MT capability at small or remote locations which do not have access to a mainframe and for MT capabilities to be carried anywhere, even on the battlefield.

"Today, Japan has at least 15 MT systems on the market or under development, compared to approximately four in the United States."

Japan is currently the country that is placing the greatest emphasis on MT. With its expanding commercial and economic markets, its hunger for information from other nations, and a growing need to disseminate its commercial/technical literature around the world, Japan urgently needs computers that can translate Japanese into other languages.[3] Today, Japan has at least 15 MT systems on the market or under development, compared to approximately four in the United States. All major Japanese computer companies are involved, as well as the Japanese government, research centers and universities.[4] MT research in Japan is now focused on improving their existing systems, developing a universal translator based upon an interlingual system, and efforts to translate voice input. Developing an MT system is not cheap. The Japanese are spending millions of dollars for translation research, knowing that there may not be a payback for their money for 10 or 15 years.[5]

Other than Japan, the organization putting the most amount of money into MT is the European Commission (EC). In 1982, the EC started the EUROTRA project. The aim of EUROTRA is to use MT to translate simultaneously from any of nine official source languages used by the EC to any number of target languages. NATO in Brussels, the Karlsruhe Research Center and the French National Space Research Center are currently leasing MT systems of the EUROTRA project from the EC. To date, approximately 46 million ECU ($35.5 million) have been invested in the project.[6]

MT Within the Military

The U.S. Air Force is the MT pioneer within the U.S. military establishment. Since 1970, the Foreign Technology Division (FTD) has funded the development of MT. It currently operates a very large MT system at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. Approximately 1,400 PCs within FTD can now interactively access the German-English, French-English and Russian-English systems on an FTD mainframe computer. The systems have traditionally been used by Air Force intelligence analysts. However, with the advent of the interactive capability and the ability to place its MT systems on stand-alone PCs, other agencies within the government also want to use FTD's MT systems.

FTD translates 70,000 to 80,000 pages per year. The French system has 68,000 stems and 51,000 expressions while the German system contains 135,000 stems and 10,000 expressions. The system with the greatest accuracy is the Russian system which possesses 210,000 stems and 140,000 expressions in its dictionaries.

USARCENT, in its search to solve its linguist problem, heard about the MT initiatives taking place at FTD and asked representatives from FTD to demonstrate the system to the staff. FTD was asked to consider adding an English-to-Arabic MT system to its mainframe which would allow USARCENT documents to be translated into Arabic, as well as using the other language systems that FTD has on its mainframe. As a result of the meeting, the USARCENT staff was surprised to discover that no other Army agency or organization was involved in the MT business. Discussions with FTD also revealed that there was possibly no staff directorate at the Army or DOD level responsible for MT or providing guidance, direction or support for this important work.

In Autumn 1989, after overcoming many internal and external barriers, USARCENT was able to establish the first MT system ever possessed by an active Army military command. Not only will the entire headquarters staff of USARCENT be able to benefit from such a system, but arrangements have been made to allow the key major subordinate commands of USARCENT, as well as Headquarters, Central Command and its other components, to activate and use the FTD systems from their locations. In addition to narrowing the linguist gap, the G5, USARCENT, who is currently responsible for the management of the language program, envisions many uses for MT across the spectrum of the staff and feels that the future capabilities of MT are limited only by the imagination of its users in enhancing the effectiveness of U.S. Army military operations abroad.

On overseas training deployments or exercises, it is envisioned that memos, trip reports, briefing slides, letters, MOUs, contracts, exercise directives, after-action reports, host-nation identification cards, books, manuals and other such publications would be likely candidates for MT.

Additionally, U.S. military commanders and their allied counterparts would be able to communicate more easily by sending and receiving personal correspondence in each other's language. Intelligence analysts in the field with no language capability could scan captured enemy or foreign correspondence for content and rapidly select information that requires immediate translation by a linguist. We would also be able to exchange intelligence data with a friendly foreign nation in its language. The data would be more meaningful to the nation as well as more timely. The G3 could provide his host-nation counterpart complete joint operations orders already translated into his language, thus enhancing combat effectiveness and reducing the margin for error or misunderstanding. Time-sensitive PSYOP leaflets, posters, radio/TV broadcast scripts, newspapers, etc., destined for the enemy or a foreign audience, could be developed in English by skilled PSYOP personnel and machine translated rapidly into the target language where it could be further refined by native translators before release.

U.S. Army personnel working with their host-nation counterparts in contracting, construction, foreign military sales, international law, labor, security assistance, etc., could exchange technical documents in each other's language. Public affairs personnel would be able to scan foreign newspapers and periodicals for information of interest without the aid of a human translator as well as prepare articles for release in the target language. An Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) which is responsible for administering our security assistance program abroad could use MT in a stand-alone mode to enhance its operations with the host nation. Memos, letters, budgets, reports and training literature could be exchanged with host-nation counterparts in their language. OMC personnel would also have the ability to scan host-nation documents without the aid of a translator. U.S. Defense Attache offices would also find stand-alone MT systems useful in carrying out their assigned missions. Civil Affairs teams, which are responsible for the greatest interface with their host-nation civilian and military counterparts during conflict or natural disasters, would be able to use stand-alone MT as a true force multiplier in enhancing operations.

It is hoped that during the FY 90-91 test period of the system by USARCENT, the full potential of the system will be realized by its users. It is also planned for USARCENT to test the stand-alone PC MT system.

"First and foremost, if there is an overall proponent for MT within the defense community, it should identify itself and make itself known to the organizations in the field."

The Issues

Before MT is a reality within the Army and can be employed as an effective force multiplier in support of military operations during the 21st century, many things must change within the Army and DOD. Probably the biggest issue currently inhibiting its growth and potential is the lack of an identified proponent on the Army, JCS or DOD staff to provide guidance and direction for this important work. Over the past year, as USARCENT sought to establish its MT capability, it became strikingly evident that no one is in charge or has admitted to being in charge of MT in the DOD community. USARCENT also found out that the establishment of an MT system for a specific language is an expensive proposition. Development of Arabic-to-English or Persian Farsi-to-English modules could cost millions of dollars of research before a software system would be available. The accompanying hardware could cost additional millions, especially if the user wants to be free of a mainframe computer and desires a stand-alone PC MT system. The last, and possibly the most serious issue which inhibits the development of MT in the United States is the lack of U.S. enterprises and institutions engaged in MT. Currently there are only four: ALPNET, Orem, Utah; the Carnegie Mellon University's Center for Machine Translation, Pittsburgh, Pa.; Logos Corporation, Waltham, Mass.; and SYSTRAN, La Jolla, Calif. Compared to the efforts of the Japanese or the EC, and the millions of research dollars that they are spending yearly on MT, the future is not too bright for U.S. enterprises.

If this trend is not reversed, the U.S. military establishment may have to depend upon foreign companies to develop and service its MT systems. Since it is envisioned that the intelligence community will be a big user of MT, foreign dominance of MT technology could possibly create security problems and restrict the applications of MT by the Army.

Addressing the Issues.

What can be done now to address the above issues which are currently impeding the successful implementation and integration of MT technology within the Army and throughout the defense community? First and foremost, if there is an overall proponent for MT within the defense community, it should identify itself and make itself known to the organizations in the field. If there is no overall proponent for MT within DOD, then the Office, Secretary of Defense should designate one. Besides providing leadership, guidance and direction to the MT program for the defense establishment, the proponent should possess a wide charter. Not only must it consider the MT requirements of the intelligence community which may be seen as the biggest user of MT, but it must also be in a position to integrate the other possible applications of MT into an overall statement of need. The proponent should consider developing a mechanism whereby liaison is established within DOD, as well as with the other U.S. governmental agencies involved in, or which should be involved in, MT. Out of this liaison, working committees can be established to collectively address, coordinate and fund MT requirements needed now and in the 21st century. Without such a mechanism the United States could lose the MT advantage it currently holds.

"MT is the technology of the 21st century which can revolutionize and enhance the way the U.S. Army does business overseas during peace or war."

Possibly, the reason that there are only four U.S. enterprise's currently engaged in MT research is due to no proponent or the lack of a strong proponent for MT within DOD or the intergovernmental community which can effectively identify and articulate the total MT requirement. Once the need for MT is perceived, requirements established, funds pooled and contracts let, existing as well as other U.S. enterprises will enter the MT research and development market. Until that happens, our government should take steps to protect the MT assets it has. Even though the numbers may be few, they possess the technology which, I feel, is currently ahead of Japan and the EC.

MT is the technology of the 21st century which can revolutionize and enhance the way the U.S. Army does business overseas during peace or war. It is a combat force multiplier that should be developed now to offset the existing and future linguist gaps and requirements of the Army. USARCENT has taken the first step to investigate the applications of MT today which will enhance its mission capabilities tomorrow and is living up to its motto: "Always First." Now is the time for DA to become involved and support this new combat force multiplier.

Footnotes:

1. Wesley A. Groesbeck, "Our Burgeoning Linguist Gap," ***Army***, December 1988, pp. 22-27.
2. K. Fujita, and Yoko Suminaga, "Japanese Machine Translators Systems Described," ***Tokyo Nikki Electronics***, February 1986, pp. 137-160.
3. B. Hillenbrand, "Trying to Decipher Babel," ***Time***, July 24, 1989. p. 62.
4. Fujita, pp. 137-160.
5. Nancy McNeil Cornell, "Translation by Telephone," ***Sky***, June 1989, p. 40.
6. ________, ***INFOTECTURE EUROPE***, N 138, October 4, 1988, Transtex International, Luxembourg.

Colonel Wesley A. Groesbeck is currently a special project officer at Fort Douglas, Utah.

LANGUAGE: A TOUGH TRAINING CHALLENGE

by Colonel Robert T. McCarty

A tough training challenge facing Military Intelligence commanders is how to maintain proficient linguists. There is no shortcut to language training; it must be consistent because the skill is highly perishable and the job is never completed. Language training demands time and must somehow be integrated into the other training and soldier tasks demanded of an MI soldier.

At I Corps and Fort Lewis, we feel that the Foreign Language Program that has been developed over the last five years provides the commander and the linguist with a workable combination of classroom instruction and self-paced training opportunities. It bridges the gap from global to MOS language skills. As a result of this program, in 1988 50 percent of the MI linguists at Fort Lewis were qualified at the FORSCOM requirement of 2/2. The keys to success are, first and foremost, sustained command emphasis from the corps level to the company level; special instructor training; the implementation of state of the art methods for second language acquisition; and a civilian language position. In addition, there is a unique cooperative spirit on Fort Lewis between the I Corps G2, the Education Services Office (ESO), the 201st MI Brigade, the 109th MI Battalion, and local Reserve and National Guard units.

The impetus for developing the program began in 1984 when the FORSCOM Language Training Office took the initiative of publishing FORSCOM Regulation 350-22. This regulation gave the proponency for MI language training to the corps-level G2s. Working closely with the ESO, a process of upgrading the Refresher/Maintenance Program at Fort Lewis began. Concurrently, the ESO became aware of some modern methods for teaching second languages that were gaining ground in civilian education. These methods include Total Physical Response, the Natural Approach, the Textual Approach developed at the NSA National Cryptologic School, a non-traditional classroom environment, and the use of music and guided imagery.

I Corps initially contracted a consultant to provide instructor training in the new methods. Participation by personnel from ESO, the 201st and the 109th in the DLI/FORSCOM Language Manager Workshops verified that we were on the right methodological track. This participation added greatly to our expertise by assisting us in focusing on proficiency based instruction as well as the use of authentic texts. Fort Lewis continues to use this FORSCOM resource for unit trainers but now requires the language contractor to provide the special instructor training in these new methods.

The 109th MI Battalion must be credited for

"Approximately 75 percent of the linguists raise their DLPT scores at least one half a level in one or more of the areas tested at the end of the four-week course."

taking the initiative for conducting the first Korean "pilot" four-week Refresher/Maintenance Course using the innovative methods mentioned above. To date we have conducted 37 four-week classes in Korean, Chinese Mandarin and Russian. Approximately 75 percent of the linguists raise their DLPT scores at least one half a level in one or more of the areas tested at the end of the four-week course. Twenty percent of those raising their scores have gone up a whole level in at least one of the areas tested.

The teaching approach in a typical four-week course is eclectic in nature using the modern theories in second language acquisition mentioned earlier. Activities such as skits, pantomime, role playing, props and music are employed. Students are involved in the creation of speeches, dialogues and written compositions. Grammar patterns, vocabulary and sentence structure are presented in novel ways using games and activities that cause the student to acquire the information in a non-coercive manner. Music is used to provide an atmosphere conducive to study. During relaxation/guided imagery sessions, students are presented with cognitive as well as cultural information. The emphasis on all classroom activities is on proficiency-based instruction and skill integration.

The environmental goal is to create a relaxed cultural ambience of the target language as well as a very comfortable, non-traditional classroom setting. There is a conscious effort to simulate the appropriate cultural environment as much as possible. No desks or chalkboards are used; students sit in comfortable chairs in a semi-circle. Butcher paper on an easel is used in place of the chalk board and becomes a permanent record of classroom activities that students have available for reference. The environment is carefully orchestrated to provide as much visual stimuli as possible. The background music is augmented by colorful posters, plants, art work and target culture objects such as flags, figurines, table coverings and costumes. There are also charts of vocabulary and grammar patterns on the wall. Props are provided for role playing and skits. The local Korean community is a tremendous resource for organized field trips and cable television programming.

Materials are taken from a variety of sources including the Defense Language Institute, FORSCOM, the National Security Agency, the Foreign Service Institute, as well as commercial sources. Of particular importance is the use of authentic texts in the classroom. This includes any audio-visual or written material that is not geared for a second language learner but is actually used by the people of the target culture. Examples would be menus, hotel bills, timetables for commercial transportation, maps, newspapers, magazines, advertisements, recipes, literature, etc.

The course does not have a rigid POI but uses the proficiency level descriptions as a guideline. The descriptions outline very detailed language behaviors in the four skills of listening, reading, writing and speaking. Within this framework, a review begins at the 0+ level with a presentation of activities that meet survival needs. This review is followed by activities that provide practice in short discussions, oral presentations, narration, translation and description. Working with the linguistic ability of the students, the instructor continuously advances the complexity of the presentation to Level 1+ and 2 activities. Eventually abstract subjects, problem solving and expressions of opinion are introduced. The goal throughout the course is to generate as much uninhibited, spontaneous manipulation of the language as possible.

"Command visibility and support was manifested in 1989, when Lieutenant General William H. Harrison dedicated the new Fort Lewis Foreign Language Facility."

Even though the four-week course deals with global language, the I Corps program bridges the gap from global to MOS "war Korean" in a variety of ways. Integrating map reading, briefings, preparation of target language briefing slides, weather reports and military terminology into the training gives it military world relevance. Prior to major exercises such as Team Spirit, spe-



Student and instructor prepare for Japanese role play. Photo: PFC Daniel Wright.



Instruction in writing Korean. Photo: PFC Daniel Wright.

cific refresher training is given related to the requirements of the event. For example, the Commanding General's interpreter spent time with the Korean Consul General to discuss protocol issues. Preparation of briefing slides in Korean script was another pre-exercise project.

An excellent example of a transition from global to MOS specific language is the Technical Certification Program (TCP) for 98Gs developed by the 109th. The four-week Refresher/Maintenance Course was followed by two weeks of technical review, then ten weeks in the TROJAN facility. It was clear from this innovative unit training that soldiers with the global language refresher were much more effective in the TCP than soldiers without a refresher.

Each MI unit on Fort Lewis deals with individualized unit training in a multiplicity of ways. Organized progression through the DLI Korean Refresher course and FLAMRIC, use of VICE, arrangements with a native speaker soldier to provide weekly in-unit interrogator practice, and MOS-related exercises are all examples of unit training. The goal of the 201st MI Brigade and the 109th MI Battalion is to provide six to ten hours per week for self-paced training.

"Here at I Corps there is a recognition at all levels of command that foreign language skills are essential to security in a multi-cultural world."

Here at I Corps everyone from the unit to the Corps level has a vital role in the Foreign Language Program. Language trainer meetings, quarterly Language Council meetings, Officer Professional Development sessions, and formal briefings provide forums for brainstorming, problem solving and exchange of ideas. Command emphasis is the key. Commanders schedule their linguists and keep them off the duty roster. A 1985 study conducted by NSA observed that "the most symbolic aspect of this (command) support, however, is allowing students to attend class in civilian clothes. This is a significant departure from traditional military practice that clearly signals to instructors, administrators and students the complete endorsement by Fort Lewis command structure of this unique foreign language training system."

Command visibility and support was manifested in 1989, when Lieutenant General William H. Harrison dedicated the new Fort Lewis Foreign Language Facility at the beginning of Foreign Language Awareness Week.

This new center provides a consolidated training building housing eight classrooms, a language lab, library, conference room, IPW booth, student lounges and office space. It is available for formal language training for Fort Lewis MI units, Reserve and National Guard units, and the 1st Special Forces Group, as well as self-paced and unit training. The facility and program is operated by the I Corps Language Coordinator and contract personnel from Central Texas College.

Foreign Language Awareness Week featured the first annual I Corps Language Olympics. This very successful program recognized the expertise and uniqueness of professional Army Korean linguists. Events such as Hanja Concentration, Pictionary and Password challenged the linguists in their abilities to speak, listen and translate.

The talents of Army linguists greatly enhance security. Senator Paul Simon is an advocate of the critical need for foreign language expertise in the United States, in military as well as civilian settings. He says, "Information is power, and the ability to communicate effectively can alter the balance of power as surely as a squadron of fighter planes or a navy flotilla. Security can come only when we see the world as it is, not as we would like it to be."

Here at I Corps there is a recognition at all levels of command that foreign language skills are essential to security in a multi-cultural world. By sustained command emphasis, marshaling our resources, fostering a spirit of cooperation and exploring new modes of delivering language instruction, we feel that commanders and linguists here at I Corps are making a large contribution to readiness. If you think anything we are doing can be applied to your unique training environment, or if you have ideas to share which may enhance the I Corps program, please contact the I Corps G2, Chief Training Branch, Major Gay McVey, (206) 967-7073 or AV 357-7073 for more information.

Colonel Robert T. McCarty is the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 , I Corps, Fort Lewis, Wash.



ECHELONS ABOVE EXCELLENCE: *Linguist Training in Action*

By Chief Warrant Officer Two Timothy E. Jones

As leaders and trainers, we know we are responsible for unit language training; but, how do we go about it? How can we make language training meaningful? What should our goals be? Who is qualified to train? How often is language training needed? Where do we train? What materials are available? These are not so much problems as challenges to our ability to provide quality and interesting sustainment language training.

At the 201st MI Brigade we believe we have successfully met this challenge. Although barely two years in existence, the 201st has developed a variety of unique linguist training programs and REDTRAIN opportunities for its Chinese and Korean linguists. Our training program is oriented and tailored to both the collective and individual needs of the soldier. The Brigade Command Language Council chaired by the commander and consisting of the brigade S3, battalion commanders and their S3s, unit program managers, and company platoon sergeants directs these efforts. We have ensured top to bottom command emphasis. This is the first step — get the commander involved!

Phase I of our program begins when the soldier arrives. The soldier's unit language program manager screens the DA 330 (DLPT test results) and informally evaluates job experience. As part of our brigade policy, the unit manager conducts a formal counseling which includes job description, responsibilities under language training regulations, the unit language training program, live environment training, the REDTRAIN program and professional development opportunities. This counseling not only informs, it demonstrates our commitment to improving the linguistic skills of the soldier. Without this commitment we cannot really expect the soldier to put forth the effort necessary to realize his or her potential.

"We have ensured top to bottom command emphasis. This is the first step — get the commander involved!"

During phase II of our program the soldier is in actual training. Using REDTRAIN funds, the Brigade has contracted for two full-time native instructors. Global and military language training is provided in a recently constructed Brigade Language Facility, also funded by REDTRAIN. Classes are held daily according to skill level, but our first priority is soldiers below FORSCOM qualification standards. They receive 30 percent more instructor time than their qualified counterparts. The classes are eclectic in that a variety of methods is employed. Lab exercises, role playing, National Cryptologic School refresher courses, real-world document exploitation, target country university language courses, and the SCOLA satellite broadcast system fed into the classrooms give us the ability to target, then correct weaknesses.

In addition, the Brigade contracts for quarterly, four-week immersion courses through Central Texas College. These courses place up to 10 soldiers in the Fort Lewis Language Training Facility for seven hours per day. Soldiers are exempt from duty and attend classes in civilian clothes. The facility has eight classrooms, a complete language lab, a full-time staff of administrators and a library of reference materials spanning 30 countries. The Central Texas College instructors are certified by the Defense Language Institute and attend in-service training courses throughout the year to retain their certification. Again, these courses are funded through REDTRAIN.

"The bottom line is this — commitment is needed at every level of the chain of command."

Phase III of our program gets right at the heart of the MI business. Having received all this language instruction, can the linguist perform his mission? Throughout the year, soldiers are regularly sent on REDTRAIN opportunities. We aggressively seek meaningful, METL driven opportunities which guarantee military application of the language. In addition to the Department of Defense, we have found that there are many federal agencies which have a need for military linguists. We continue to fill the needs of the Coast Guard, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Defense Intelligence Agency and the Foreign Science and Technology Center.

We use the Voice Interceptor Comprehensive Evaluation, Korean Technical Support Package and TROJAN to train MOS-specific skills. We have developed a two week Technical Certification Program (TCP) that reviews intelligence collection procedures and refines skills. Graduates of the TCP are then placed in TROJAN for practical application.

We round up our training with the annual I Corps Language Olympics. This three day event is conducted by the 502d Military Intelligence Battalion and attracts Active Component, Reserve Component and National Guard units from as far away as Alaska, Hawaii, Utah and California. All of the events are METL driven and target the 2/2 linguist in all four skills. Two-man teams compete for individual medals with best overall unit trophies presented at the conclusion. The fever pitched excitement and determination to win displayed by all participants has exceeded our expectations. The presence of the Commanding General, his deputy and the Chief of Staff points up the importance of command emphasis. Without it, we achieve little.

"We have documented results showing that soldiers see an increase in language proficiency averaging 1/2 of a skill level when given sustained unit training, full immersion courses and meaningful REDTRAIN opportunities."

Although it is in its early stages, our program is aggressive in its approach to training. It begins with command involvement and ends with soldier improvement. The bottom line is this — commitment is needed at every level of the chain of command. Suggestions and ideas are encouraged. Imaginative leadership is indispensable. As the Command Language Program Manager, I have found that if you show an interest, there will be an increase in those who are eager to help. Your active involvement improves the linguistic proficiency of your soldiers, puts pro-pay in their pockets, enhances morale and positively affects the unit re-enlistment program. Everyone wins.

For the doubting, I offer the following. We have documented results showing that soldiers see an increase in language proficiency averaging 1/2 of a skill level when given sustained unit training, full immersion courses and meaningful REDTRAIN opportunities. Twenty percent have improved by one full level. You just have to explore every opportunity and use your imagination to figure out a way to accomplish the mission when surrounded by doubting Thomases. **Just do it!**

Chief Warrant Officer Two Timothy E. Jones is the Brigade Language Officer, 201st MI Brigade, Fort Lewis, Wash.

REFORGER: INTEROPERABILITY AT ITS BEST

By Major Gary L. Parrish

As the political situation in Eastern Europe changes, the need for the armies of the Central Army Group to train together will not diminish. While U.S. forces will be reduced in Europe as a result of CFE, interoperability with our allies will become even more important. Participation in major training exercises is the only way we can establish and test interoperability procedures between the armies of the different NATO countries responsible for keeping peace in Western Europe. The recent REFORGER exercise provided an excellent opportunity to strengthen a partnership of support and interoperability among the intelligence units of the participating U.S., German, French and Canadian armies. I am going to focus this article on the intelligence support provided by the 511th Military Intelligence (Tactical Exploitation) Battalion to a German division during the recent CENTURION SHIELD 90 exercise.

The tactical exploitation battalion of the MI brigade is the corps commander's primary ground based intelligence unit that can be committed to weight the collection effort in a particular sector on the battlefield. On REFORGER 90 the VII Corps commander decided to allocate his only "intelligence plug" to the 12th Panzer Division. This provided an outstanding training opportunity to evaluate the interoperability between the U.S. and German intelligence units. Since all U.S. divisions under the VII Corps had their own organic CEWI battalions, the goal was to provide the 12th Panzer Division with an intelligence collection capability comparable to that of the U.S. divisions.

The Need

Intelligence officers at every echelon will argue that intelligence is a national responsibility, and the 12th Panzer Division commander would tend to agree. Currently only eight of the 12 divisions of the German army have their own organic intelligence and reconnaissance units fielded. The typical German intelligence and reconnaissance unit contains an armored reconnaissance battalion, a target acquisition battalion with a drone battery, an IEW company and an interrogation platoon.

Due to the force structure limitations, the 12th Panzer Division does not have an organic ground based IEW company and its CL 289 drone battery is not scheduled to be fielded until FY 92. The German interrogation platoon is manned predominantly by reservists and only trains semiannually on large exercises such as REFORGER. The German division also lacks the long-range surveillance assets found in the U.S. CEWI battalions and in the Corps MI brigade. Without these critical intelligence assets, the collection and reconnaissance capability of the 12th Panzer Division is severely limited.

The 12th Panzer Division's mission for week one of REFORGER highlighted the division's need for additional intelligence assets. The division would be utilized in an economy of force role, defending in the south, with the Donau River separating it from the other VII Corps units. The Corps commander would assume a risk in the south and concentrate maneuver forces north of the Donau River where the enemy's main attack was anticipated. With an extremely large sector to defend, the division's need for early warning and identification of the threat's main effort was critical. METT-T confirmed the need to augment the 12th Panzer Division's austere reconnaissance assets with a ground based "intelligence plug."

The Solution

Approximately eight weeks prior to deploying on REFORGER, the VII Corps commander directed the 207th MI Brigade to put together an intelligence package to support the 12th Panzer Division. It should be noted that this was not the first time the brigade's ground based IEW assets would be supporting the German division. On REFORGER 88, a company Task Force of ground based IEW assets was provided to the 12th Panzer Division. With extensive augmentation, this mission can be accomplished because the tactical exploitation battalion is structured to allow organizational flexibility and tailoring of its assets to provide direct support to maneuver divisions. The ground based assets are designed to be used as a "plug" for other CEWI units and because of force structure constraints, cannot act as stand alone units.

The initial task was to take the 511th's Headquarters Company and EW Company and form the nucleus of a divisional CEWI battalion. The CI/interrogation company and the LRSU company would remain in general support of the Corps and would be under the operational control of the brigade. To provide the 12th Panzer Division with a comparable intelligence capability, an additional EW company and LRSU detachment had to be attached to the 511th. Detachment 101 of the 1st Infantry Division (FWD) and D/103rd MI Battalion (LRSU) were attached to form the new 511th MI Task Force. Prior to deploying on REFORGER, the battalion had several major tasks to accomplish if the combined Task Force was going to be successful.

The ability of the 511th's staff to adapt to a change in the doctrinal mission of the headquarters would test the unit's operational flexibility. The first step was to learn about the 12th Panzer Division and to educate their staff on the Task Force's capabilities. The initial planning sessions with the division staff laid the cornerstone for a mutually rewarding training exercise. A detailed logistics plan to support the new "CEWI" battalion had to be developed, coordinated and implemented. The German divisions establish their tactical operations centers using the "town concept" — two identical command posts located in different towns. Since they had planned their TOC locations months prior, space and communications support for the Task Force TOC and TCAE had to be coordinated.

The 511th battalion staff had to be brought into the operational planning of the division at the earliest opportunity. After receiving the division G2's reconnaissance plan, the Task Force conducted a thorough reconnaissance of the division's area of operations. Based on the division reconnaissance plan, the battalion selected baselines and battle positions for its IEW assets to support the division commander's concept of the operation. These positions were integrated into the division G2's reconnaissance plan and closely coordinated with the Recce Battalion to ensure complimentary and overlapping coverage. Additionally, the IEW and LRSU positions were coordinated with the Corps G2 to ensure the positions selected were incorporated into the corps collection plan.

The final step was to conduct a five-day FTX to "field test" the new 511th MI Task Force. Since the Task Force was to be comprised of soldiers and equipment from 22 different units, using both active and reserve components, the complete battalion package could not be exercised together. The FTX was conducted three weeks prior to deploying on REFORGER and exercised the tasking and reporting procedures between the TOC/TCAE and the two EW companies. The real "field test" of the Task Force would come on REFORGER.

The Exercise

Prior to the start of the maneuver phase of the REFORGER exercise, most of the interoperability had occurred between the staffs of the division and the Task Force. Once the exercise began, the Task Force staff and Task Force liaison element to the division G2 began to exercise a myriad of interoperability links. The liaison element became the focal point for coordinating the Task Force intelligence operations with the division's reconnaissance battalion, the maneuver brigades, the divisional liaison officers and the Corps TAC CP.

The key to synchronizing the collection efforts of the Task Force was the G2's reconnaissance plan which is based on the division commander's concept of the operation. Based on the division reconnaissance and intelligence requirements, reconnaissance areas were prioritized for coverage by the Task Force assets. The battalion staff developed the concept of employment of its sys-



INTEROPERABILITY AT ITS BEST

Computer Graphics:
Kazuko Klever

tems based on the G2 reconnaissance plan and the Corps collection plan.

After coordinating with the maneuver brigades and reconnoitering positions, the IEW teams occupied forward intercept/direction finding baselines to support the G2's collection priorities. The LRSU teams were employed in belts across the division front and were tied in with the German armored reconnaissance battalion along the Lech River and the French LRSU teams supporting the Corps. The coordination between the reconnaissance and intelligence assets of the Task Force, the division and Corps was an interoperability success.

The Task Force provided the 12th Panzer Division commander with a responsive, multidiscipline intelligence capability and provided direct access to Corps deep look collection assets via the TCAE-TCAE link. Close coordination between Corps and the Task Force ensured mutual support and aided in the cueing of other collection assets. The Task Force provided timely and accurate early warning of threat indications to include identifying the "spearhead" of the attacking enemy formations. The 12th Panzer Division commander often referred to the Task Force MI and the 12th Recce Battalion as his "Eyes on the Ground."

The Lesson

Converting a tactical exploitation battalion into a direct support CEWI battalion in eight weeks was not without a cost. Some invaluable lessons were learned from REFORGER by the soldiers of the 511th Task Force in support of the 12th Panzer Division.

If the tactical exploitation battalion is going to be the corps commander's intelligence "plug," the battalion's Tables of Organization and Equipment must undergo major modifications. To provide the needed flexibility, additional IEW, communications, logistics and maintenance assets are required to make the tactical exploitation battalion a viable "plug."

Coordination, planning and operating procedures between allied and U.S. intelligence units must be implemented as early as possible. This is vital to improving the working of interoperability links between allied intelligence units. A strong liaison element that is linguistically qualified in the supported unit's native language is essential to the integration of the Task Force into the organizational planning of the division.

A German division operates two complete, full-up TOCs and jumps at least one of the command posts every 24 hours. The tactical exploitation battalion currently does not have the personnel or equipment to support two TOC/TCAE packages to maintain constant operations for the division TOCs. When the Task Force jumped the battalion TOC/TCAE, all communication links with the Corps and Division were temporarily lost. During the jump, the intelligence being collected by the Task Force assets lost its value because it was not processed and disseminated in a timely manner.

The G2 section of the 12th Panzer Division does not have an organic analytical capability comparable to an all-source intelligence cell found in a U.S. division G2 section. The majority of the division's G2/reconnaissance section is comprised of reserve personnel who have little or no intelligence analysis training. The addition of an analysis cell in the reconnaissance section will improve operations within the division G2.

The Value

The value of an exercise the magnitude of REFORGER is difficult to measure for many units, but it was not difficult for the 511th MI Task Force. Simply speaking, the training value of REFORGER was without equal. Approximately 75 percent of what we did was new to the battalion. Every activity from the initial planning to the final after action report created multiple training opportunities. REFORGER is the premier training event in USAREUR that allows U.S. intelligence organizations to exercise interoperability links with both U.S. and allied intelligence units. For the 511th MI Task Force, REFORGER provided an outstanding training environment to improve the cooperation with our allied units. Interoperability is more than a "buzz-word" — it is a reality that will become even more important as changes continue in Western Europe. Interoperability will only improve through habitual training with our allies.

Major Gary L. Parrish is currently the S3 of the 511th MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation), 207th MI Brigade, Ludwigsburg, West Germany. Previous assignments include Corps G2 Plans Officer, Company Commander (twice), Brigade S2, Battalion S2 and S4. He is a 1978 distinguished military graduate of the Univ. of North Florida and holds a Master's Degree from Webster Univ.

VANTAGE POINT *(Continued)*

(Continued from page 2)

distributed to the field in the 1st quarter of FY 91, and I encourage every intelligence professional to become intimately familiar with both of them. We are also expanding and refining the collection management and R&S planning training we are providing in our resident instruction, including the MI Officer Basic Course, MI Officer Advanced Course, 35C Track Course, 35G Track Course, Collection Management TENCAP Course, and the Precommand Course.

All of us must do all we can to ensure we take maximum advantage of the opportunities these new capabilities will provide, as well as ensuring that we continue to satisfy commanders' requirements at every echelon. We must know how to focus and synchronize our IEW capabilities, whether they are today's systems or those coming over the next few years, so that we can meet our responsibilities in helping commanders focus and leverage combat power to win on any battlefield.

(Continued from page 3)

Reserve Components on August 31, 1991. As a planning goal, the current SQT for sergeants through sergeants first class for each MOS and grade will be used until October 1, 1991 for the active component and until October 1, 1992 for the reserve component

An NCO self-development test (SDT) will be developed over a one to two year period. The NCO SDT will be a formally administered written test designed to evaluate the proficiency of the individual NCO in many areas of soldier skills. The Army has made significant progress in the education of its NCOs. PLDC, BNCOC and ANCOC are the building blocks of this program. The NCO Leaders Development Action Plan recognizes these increased skills, knowledge and attitudes derived from the nine leader competencies in FM 22-100. By doctrine, these competencies provide the framework for leader development and assessment. Heretofore, we had no standardized test to assess self-development. SDT fills this need. Our NCOs today are professional, reflecting the qualities of competence, responsibility and commitment that are the essence of professionalism. Self-development, one of the pillars of leader development, will serve as the vehicle for an NCO to measure and guide his/her growth in professional competence. Self-development is a personal responsibility.

The SDT will be a formally administered written test of MOS skills, training and leadership knowledge, with the soldiers manual as the primary source of questions. The leadership competencies that have been developed and are outlined in the NCO Leadership Development Action Plan will be the basis for the leadership portion of each SDT.

A specific test will be developed within each MOS for sergeants, staff sergeants and sergeants first class. Until each of these tests is implemented in each MOS, the NCOs will continue to take the current SQT for their MOS and grade.

After full implementation, the SDT will be used for the assessment of individual self-development and may also be one of the key factors in determining NCO promotions, assignments, school selection and retention.

Essentially, the NCO SDT will place responsibility for preparation personally on each NCO and will require intensive individual use of training reference materials. Active component NCOs will take the SDT annually and reserve component NCOs will take it every two years.

The NCO SDT will help ensure that our quality soldiers develop into noncommissioned officers of unparalleled professionalism and that our NCOs sustain the levels of performance that have made the Army of today the finest peacetime force this nation has ever fielded.

TAKING CHARGE: NOTES FOR FUTURE COMMANDERS

By Captain Ken Robinson

"Commander, take charge of your unit." This is the first order you'll receive when you assume command. A successful command requires you to possess the ability to motivate, communicate and lead soldiers. And that will require planning and preparation.

Where Do You Start?

Start with doctrine! FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, says it best: "Our Army is made up of people, doctrine, organizations, weapons and equipment. It is leadership, however that brings all of these together and makes them work."[1]

The Army has an appropriate slogan on how a leader can become effective and take charge. It is called, "Be, Know and Do." These attributes will affect how you lead. Your beliefs, values and character will influence how you think. What you think will determine how you apply what you know.

Bottom Line: Read doctrine, study leadership techniques and lead by example. When assuming command you may find yourself in situations you have not been trained for. Appendix D and E of FM 22-100 provide some excellent tips to prepare you. "When assuming leadership positions all your initial efforts should be directed to:

- Determine what is expected of your unit.
- Determine what is expected of yourself.
- Determine strengths and weaknesses of subordinates.
- Determine key people whose support is necessary to accomplish your mission."[2]

When the time comes for some analysis of your situation, ask yourself these questions before you assume your command:

- What type of unit is this in terms of morale, discipline, combat readiness and junior leadership development?
- Is there an existing functioning NCO support chain?
- What is the leadership style of the battalion commander?
- What was the leadership style of the previous commander and first sergeant? How effective was it?
- Do the teams, squads and platoons accomplish their tasks routinely or is detailed supervision required?
- Are there existing SOPs based on ARTEP or measurable Army standards?
- Does the unit have a "rights of passage" program for its soldiers? Is it effective or do they pay lip service to it?

Based on these seven questions you should then make some initial decisions on an appropriate leadership style. I believe the ideal style is one that gives the NCOs room to breathe, forces platoon leaders to make tough decisions and compliments, not conflicts, with the first sergeant, your senior NCO trainer/leader.

Once you settle on a style, your next focus should be on the transition. In Perry Smith's book **"Taking Charge. A Practical Guide for Leaders"** he gives potential commanders sound advice.

> "Many individuals taking over leadership positions fail to think through the transition process. They fail to plan to take charge and so fail to maximize their opportunities to be well prepared. By approaching the transition process in a systematic way and following a checklist carefully, a leader can be much more effective in the first few important weeks after taking over."[3]

Have a plan. Coordinate it thoroughly, higher to lower and left to right. Involve the NCOs in the process. Keep them on board with you from the very beginning and hold them accountable for their actions.

A good technique to use to get "read-on" as a new commander is the brief/backbrief. Require a briefing from every key leader. The brief should be short and to the point. At a minimum it should include:

- The unit's mission.
- How the leader sees his element supporting the company and battalion mission.
- Status of personnel and equipment.
- What missions, deployments, training events and initiatives are currently scheduled?
- What is their status and suspense?
- What assistance does the leader need from the company to accomplish his mission?
- (Additional bullets are mission, enemy, terrain and troops dependent.)

From these few questions you will learn a lot about your unit that may have been missed during overlap with the previous commander. The briefs will be a "reality check" on where your chain of command is in terms of a "go to war" mentality, communications skills, attention to detail, knowledge of their unit and mission priorities. This method will give you a chance to assess your initial leadership style, give guidance on critical short range training events and identify potential problems.

As quickly as possible meet and talk to your soldiers. Remember the rule on first impressions. This is the best time to cover your command philosophy. It should be carefully thought out, previously discussed with the first sergeant and logically presented. Ask for feedback from your subordinates. Keep your communications with them "two way," and you will quickly gain credibility as a leader who listens.

The Army has gone through a great expense to train your soldiers. Under Army of Excellence you cannot afford to lose a single one. Early in your transition you must ensure that they are in compliance with the Army safety program outlined in AR 600-50, *Standards of Conduct for Department of Army Personnel.* Another technique is to add an additional paragraph to each operations order (Paragraph 6-SAFETY). Ensure that your chain of command understands that they are all safety officers. On the spot corrections are everyone's business and a **leader's responsibility**. By requiring your leaders to conduct thorough backbriefs prior to every training event, you will ensure that safety has been considered and precious training time is effectively managed to Army standards.

Many opportunities to get a unit squared away are lost because of poor planning and preparation for the change of command inventory. Prior to your inventory, schedule an office call with the battalion XO and maintenance officer. Good background information on your unit's maintenance posture will come from this meeting. Read the deadline report, results of the last battalion command inspection, and results of the last IG inspection.

The information provided by this research will cue you to areas that may require command emphasis. With this information you are ready to produce your change of command training schedule. This schedule is your OPORD. Ensure your leaders understand that. Clearly state your standards for the inventory. Ensure the inventory is joint and all like items are inspected together.

Leading: Fundamentals to Remember.

Perry Smith's book, **Taking Charge**, lists some fundamentals for a commander to live by. A review of these will assist you in developing your leadership style:

- TRUST IS VITAL. If you lead a large organization, it is essential to be able to trust your subordinate leaders.
- A LEADER MUST BE A GOOD TEACHER. Teachership and leadership go hand-in-glove. The

leader must be willing to teach skills, to share insights and experiences, and to work very closely with people to help them mature and be creative.

• A LEADER SHOULD RARELY BE A PROBLEM SOLVER. A leader should facilitate problem solving but should let subordinates solve most problems.

• A LEADER MUST BE A COMMUNICATOR. If a leader is a good writer, communications, both up and down the organizational structure, will occur in a way that is meaningful, understandable and has impact.

• A LEADER MUST MANAGE TIME WELL AND USE IT EFFECTIVELY.

• LEADERS MUST BE WILLING TO REMOVE PEOPLE FOR JUST CAUSE. Leaders are not serving themselves well; they're not serving the institution well; and in many cases, they're not serving the incompetent individuals well by keeping them in responsible positions.

• LEADERS MUST TAKE CARE OF THEIR PEOPLE.

• LEADERS MUST PROVIDE VISION. Leaders who are not planners are simply caretakers and gatekeepers.

• LEADERS MUST SUBORDINATE THEIR AMBITIONS AND EGOS TO THE GOALS OF THE UNIT OR THE INSTITUTION THAT THEY LEAD.

• LEADERS MUST KNOW HOW TO RUN MEETINGS. Much of a leader's time is spent in meetings. Leaders should know what kind of meeting they're attending; they should establish the ground rules for the meetings.

• LEADERS MUST UNDERSTAND THE DECISION MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES.

• LEADERS MUST BE VISIBLE AND APPROACHABLE. In large organizations, the four-hour rule is a useful guide. Leaders should spend no more than four hours a day in their offices. The rest of the time should be spent with their people.

• LEADERS SHOULD HAVE A SENSE OF HUMOR. Most of the time, leaders should laugh at themselves rather than at others.

• LEADERS MUST BE DECISIVE, BUT PATIENTLY DECISIVE. Leaders should listen to all sides before deciding.

• LEADERS SHOULD BE INTROSPECTIVE. Leaders should be able to look at themselves objectively and analyze where they have made mistakes, where they've turned people off and where they've headed down the wrong path.

• LEADERS SHOULD BE RELIABLE. A leader should be careful about what commitments are made, but once those commitments are firm, nothing should alter them.

• LEADERS SHOULD BE OPEN-MINDED. The best leaders are the ones whose minds are never closed, who are interested in hearing new points of view, and who are eager to deal with new issues.

• LEADERS SHOULD ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN HIGH STANDARDS OF DIGNITY.

• LEADERS SHOULD SHOW INTEGRITY. Leaders should not only talk about integrity, they must also operate at a high level of integrity.They should emphasize both personal and institutional integrity.

And Finally-

Plan the first two weeks of your transition in great detail. When you get your chain-of-command together talk **to** them, not **at** them. Solicit feedback. Ensure your leaders understand that it is their responsibility to provide you feedback and options, not bitches and complaints. Seek out former successful commanders to mentor you. Many of their good ideas will reduce your learning curve.

None of this is all inclusive. It is intended to stimulate your thoughts. Prepare yourself for a professionally rewarding experience. Your command time will go quickly, so don't waste it. **Take charge!**

Footnotes

1. Field Manual FM 22-100, *Military Leadership,* Oct 1983, pg 1-2.
2. op cit, Appendix D & E, pg 229.
3. Perry M. Smith, **Taking Charge. A Practical Guide for Leaders** (National Defense University Press, 1986), Chapter 2, p. 17.

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"Recent political developments in the Soviet Union suggest that Gorbachev is preparing to jettison the Communist Party (CPSU) as a mechanism of government and a source of legitimacy."

AFTER PERESTROIKA:
A NEW, IMPROVED COMMUNIST THREAT?

By Captain Chris A. Pilecki

The threat in Europe is changing, but the new threat is not likely to be that charismatic trio — Marx, Lenin and Gorbachev — dressed up for a snazzy "GQ" pictorial. *Perestroika* is not an attempt to outfit communism with new, Western clothes. It is a frantic effort to find a way out of one of the most catastrophic dead-ends in human history.

In a recent article ("The New Threat," ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin***, January-March 1990), Lieutenant Drew Swank suggests that Soviet "New Thinking" will lead to "a stronger Soviet Union in terms of economic base, military potential and even ideological acceptance." His argument is based on the premise that reform can make a communist-style command economy work. I believe that the five-year history of *perestroika* points in an entirely different direction.

It seems clear that Gorbachev's original aim in launching *perestroika* and *glasnost* was precisely the goal which Swank describes. Gorbachev believed that removing dead bureaucratic weight would be sufficient to revive the Soviet economy, requiring minimal political reform.

It is also clear that the attempt failed. The evidence now strongly suggests that communism cannot be reformed, in Gorbachev's original sense. One-party rule over a command economy is a recipe for disaster. The examples abound: In the 1970's and 1980's, East European states attempted economic liberalization in a tacit exchange for the depoliticization of their populations. The results of this "goulash communism" in Eastern Europe were obsolete industries and crushing debt burdens. China's reform program sought a market economy with no political reform, with tragic results last summer. The Soviet Union has instead been trying to strike a delicate balance between economic and political reforms. Yet with each new effort to jump-start the economy, Gorbachev has been forced to take another political step away from communism.

"Communism" and "modern, efficient economy" are contradictory terms. The next step in this argument, I'll admit, is harder to take: An economically reviving Soviet Union must cease to be an ideologically threatening one.

I can't agree with Swank's argument that "the United States has been upstaged at its own game" by a modernizing and reforming Soviet Union. The Soviet reform program has now brought Gorbachev to the point of all but renouncing the entire communist experiment. This is certainly the case in Eastern Europe, where new governments openly speak of 45 wasted years. Far from being upstaged, American political values are being embraced, and newly-freed nations are looking West for inspiration and assistance.

The Soviet Union has less openly embarked on this path, in part because the country's political existence, and not just its government, is built on a collapsing ideology. Once Marx and Lenin are tossed overboard, Communist Party rule loses all pretense of legitimacy. Yet I believe that Gorbachev is inching cautiously in this direction, attempting to stave off total political as well as economic collapse as he looks for a way out of communism's blind alley.

Recent political developments in the Soviet Union suggest that Gorbachev is preparing to jettison the Communist Party (CPSU) as a mechanism of government and a source of legitimacy. The new Congress of People's Deputies, the movement towards free elections and — most importantly — the new and powerful presidency all serve to establish a source of political legitimacy other than the CPSU. The repeal of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which guaranteed the Communist Party's monopoly of power, is also a step in this direction.

"Gorbachev has declared — and demonstrated — that he wants the Soviet Union to rejoin Europe."

I doubt that Gorbachev accepts the idea that the CPSU will inevitably go the way of the East European communist parties, surviving at best as a small opposition. He has, however, positioned himself to remain in charge should the CPSU be swept aside in coming elections, and with a power base and source of legitimacy that do not derive from his position as party leader. More important, with the provision for popular election of the president after 1995, Gorbachev has created the possibility that his successors will enjoy authentic, democratic legitimacy.

Lest this sound overly optimistic, let me emphasize that these are only **possibilities** inherent in the Soviet reform program. Gorbachev's ability to get off the dying communist horse midstream is still in question. To the extent that reform remains peaceful, the Soviet Union seems at worst headed in the direction of traditional authoritarianism, stripped of communism's messianic ideological pretensions.

I am also not suggesting that we unilaterally disarm, dismantle NATO and head for home convinced that Europe is finally safe for democracy. Mindful that this is an especially risky time for crystal-ball-gazing, I submit that we can read about Europe's new dangers in our old history books.

The danger of civil war in the Soviet Union. Without Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union loses its *raison d'etre*. Tensions are building between Moscow and independence-minded republics and have already erupted into conflicts between central Asian republics. At least partial disintegration of the Soviet empire is likely, and a violent disintegration could aggravate a second source of danger.

The danger of instability in Eastern Europe. National tensions are growing in East Europe states freed from communist-imposed stability. As before World War II, Eastern Europe remains an area of "unfinished nations," which have not established a firm cultural and territorial identity. Communism only suppressed these problems; it could not solve them. After World War II, the exhausted countries of Western Europe put aside old animosities and began the processes of regional cooperation leading to today's European Community. East European nations still largely need to define themselves, before they can follow a similar path.

The danger of "Great Power" rivalry. Gorbachev has declared — and demonstrated — that he wants the Soviet Union to rejoin Europe. Even if the Soviet Union becomes a more democratic — and possibly smaller — country, it will continue to be one of the dominant players in Europe. It will continue to pursue its own interests as its leaders define them.

Ultimately, we can hope that transnational problems such as environmental protection and economic development, which defy solution at the national level, will supersede the primacy of the nation-state. But we're not there yet. In the meantime, we shouldn't lose too much sleep worrying about a resurgence of communism. Marx and Lenin are being buried, not resuscitated.

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AFGHANISTAN REVISITED: Soviet Lessons Learned

By Captain Aaron A. Danis

In February 1989 the Soviet Union completed the withdrawal of 120,000 troops from its 10-year commitment to the Communist Afghan regime. Rapidly evolving world events have buried the West's interest in the Soviet Afghan invasion. Soviet pronouncements of a new "defensive doctrine," as well as conventional arms cuts, overshadow important military lessons that they learned during their intervention. Since the Soviet military has not released any official after-action review of its performance in Afghanistan (an unlikely event), Soviet lessons must be discerned from Soviet military writings, as well as Western press and civilian military analysts who traveled in Afghanistan with the *Mujahedin* and the Soviets.

The lessons learned in Afghanistan are important because the invasion was the Soviets' first direct military intervention outside the Eastern Bloc since the end of World War II. It also placed the Soviets in the position of directly opposing a guerrilla force instead of supporting one. The fighting in Afghanistan led to a gradual evolution in Soviet tactics, force structure and training during the conflict, and will likely influence them in the future as they face internal dissent.

In order to keep Soviet lessons learned in the proper context, we must examine the Soviet invasion vis-a-vis its goals:

"In 1980 Moscow's primary long-term goal was to develop an Afghan communist government capable of dominating the country politically and militarily by itself, ultimately making the presence of Soviet troops unnecessary. The 40th Army's combat role was subordinated to this overall political strategy. It was not required to win a victory by purely military means or to suppress the *Mujahedin* resistance fighters completely. The Soviet occupation force remained limited in size in accordance to its constrained mission..."[1]

This mission was to keep the insurgency at a tolerable level so the Afghan government could gradually regain its legs, while at the same time keeping Soviet casualties low. To this end, Soviet force levels were maintained at only 80,000 to 120,000 troops throughout the conflict. However, the constraints the Soviet hierarchy placed on the level of military involvement would have important ramifications for its counterinsurgency strategy.

In examining Soviet combat actions in Afghanistan, I will focus on tactical and operational doctrine and the ability to execute it. It is limited to four basic areas where the Soviets showed particular weaknesses and subsequent revisions of prior doctrine:

- Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.
- Mountain warfare capabilities.
- Use of airpower.
- Troop/weapon performance.

This study will be kept broad in scope so as to assess the impact on the doctrine and force structure of the Soviet Army as a whole.

Counterinsurgency Strategy

The Soviet military entered Afghanistan without a viable strategy for low intensity conflict (LIC) and was totally unprepared to fight a COIN campaign. This mattered little during the first two years of the conflict for the initial Soviet goal was to gain control of the Afghan government and military, garrison the major cities, and protect the lines of communication (LOC) to the Soviet Union and between garrisons. This stronghold strategy fell back on experience gained in Eastern European "local wars," such as Czechoslovakia in 1968.[2] This period was marked by multi-division sweeps launched from garrison in order to crush local *Mujahedin* resistance and defeat Afghan army mutinies.

During the winter of 1980, the military hierarchy realized that mechanized sweeps of the valleys, using tactics more akin to Central Europe, had little effect on rebel operations. During a sweep, the rebels would vacate the valley floors in favor of the mountains. When the Soviets left the valleys they often left a hapless Afghan Army outpost behind to fend for itself. Though it would be several years before the Soviets would abandon this tactic, they eventually turned to the experience gained fighting the *basmachi* revolt in Central Asia (Mongolia) from 1919-1928 in order to find a way to pacify the increasingly irksome *Mujahedin*. This occurred because of the religious and ethnic similarities of the rebels in both situations.

In the 1920's, the then Soviet military commander M. B. Frunze, developed five general objectives which his forces used successfully to fight the *basmachi*:

- Establish powerful garrisons to control the cities.
- Protect lines of communication.
- Drive insurgents into isolated areas where it is easier to encircle and destroy them.
- Locate bands of guerrillas and deploy large formations to capture their operational centers.
- Seal border passes and escape routes to cut off avenues of retreat and external support.[3]

Just as importantly, Frunze realized it would be impossible to win by military force alone. He emphasized the use of political and socioeconomic measures, including rebuilding the local economy and redistributing land to the peasants.

Having accomplished the first three of Frunze's general objectives during the initial two years of the Afghan invasion, the Soviets attempted operations in early 1981 to achieve the last two, but their execution was seriously flawed in several aspects. In 1981-1983, the Soviets explored the use of small-unit offensive sweeps as a substitute for the ineffective large-scale operations. The combined arms reinforced battalion (CARB), consisting of three motorized rifle companies, a tank company, an artillery battery and supporting engineers, became the core subunit of the Soviet forces.[4] The CARB was used in conjunction with airmobile units, attack helicopters and, on occasion, chemical strikes. In operations reminiscent of U.S. forces in Vietnam, the Soviets employed classic "anvil and hammer" and search-and-destroy tactics in an attempt to encircle *Mujahedin* camps.

These operations failed due to an over-centralized command structure and a lack of unit-level initiative, which often allowed the rebels to escape before the cordons closed, and the over-reliance of Soviet infantry on their armored vehicles. In one case, a CARB left the main road near Paktia and was virtually destroyed when its inexperienced troops panicked and hid behind their vehicles until they ran out of ammunition and were killed.[5] Instead of dismounting to engage the rebels, the Soviets relied on superior weapons, firepower and mobility in an attempt to minimize Soviet casualties.

In early 1983, the Soviets responded to these deficiencies by creating a dedicated COIN force. This force totaling 18,000-23,000 soldiers, was comprised of 10,000 airborne troops; 5,000-7,000 air assault troops formed in at least one air assault brigade and several battalions; 5,000 designated reconnaissance troops; and 3,000-4,000 special operations (*Spetsnaz*) troops.[6] Taking advantage of their greater initiative, these forces were successful in locating and destroying some *Mujahedin* bases near the border and intercepting arms shipments from Pakistan. However, overall Soviet policy prevented these forces from being employed in large enough numbers. Generally accepted figures state that 20,000 of the estimated 80,000 *Mujahedin* forces were in country at any one time, maintaining a rough parity with the Soviet COIN force. A force ratio of between six to ten to one is the usual figure cited for a COIN campaign to have a reasonable chance for success; this supports the contention that after 1983, the Soviets were trying to maintain a status quo against the rebels, possibly believing that the quality of their COIN force would make up for the one to one ratio in troops. For a military system which thrives on establishing a proper correlation of forces and victory, this is an unusual and interesting development.

Soviet military-civil relations, a basic tenet in Frunze's plans, also left much to be desired. Frunze had used a detachment of culturally similar Volga Tartars in his campaign in Central Asia to show that Moslem peoples could be integrated into the Soviet state. In 1979-80, the initial Soviet invasion force of 80,000 men was comprised of 30-40 percent Central Asian reservists. Though the Soviet leadership hoped they would set a similar example for the Afghans, this did not occur. The Central Asians were poorly trained and expressed little interest in fighting their "neighbors." In fact, they sometimes defected to them. Also, the *Mujahedin* never took seriously Soviet efforts to portray the Afghan government and military as Islamic in nature. Instead, the rebels elevated their conflict against the Soviet backed government to the level of *Jihad*, or Holy War.[7] Most Central Asians were subsequently withdrawn by the end of 1980, and by 1982 the Soviets gave up whatever hope they held of winning the loyalty of the populace. Instead, they relied on a campaign of intimidation, subversion and reprisal; killing and displacing thousands of Afghan civilians; and deporting hundreds of children to the Soviet Union for re-education.[8]

Based on the Frunze analogy, the Soviets failed to advance beyond the first three objectives using the tactics described above. They were not successful in insulating the rebels from outside support from Pakistan, China or Iran, nor were they ever able to consistently isolate and destroy *Mujahedin* base camps. This would have required a much larger force which the Soviet hierarchy could not politically justify, internally or internationally. Soviet scorched-earth policies designed to isolate the rebels from their base of support in lieu of co-opting them, forced that base of support across the Pakistan border where it was out of Soviet reach. In the end, the Soviet emphasis on a limited, military conflict against an enemy fighting the equivalent of total war gave them the only result possible: a long stalemate. Even without the restrictions on the size of the Soviet military effort, it is debatable whether Soviet repression tactics would have squelched the insurgency.

Mountain Warfare Capabilities

Soviet weaknesses in mountain warfare were typical of their tactical and operational vulnerabilities and had a direct negative effect on the Soviet Army's COIN strategy. Unlike the European theater, with its moderate climate and rolling terrain, Afghanistan is composed of desert and highly restrictive mountainous terrain, with severe extremes in climate and temperature. The Hindu Kush mountain range covers half the country, with peaks as high as 7,000 meters. Forty-nine percent of the country is above the 2,000 meter level. Soviet LOCs ran 450 kilometers from Termez to Kabul, passing through the 2,700 meter-long Salang Pass tunnel, becoming the most important single transportation route in the country.[9] Though the Soviets had doctrine dealing with warfare in the mountains, it was oriented, predictably, toward armored operations, and no mountain warfare units had been seen in the Soviet order of battle for years.

In the July 1978 edition of *Voyennyi Vestnik*, General Lieutenant D. Shrudnev stated that tanks could operate in the mountains "jointly with motorized rifle and artillery units, and even sometimes independently."[10] The folly of this approach quickly became evident, as tanks without an infantry screen were vulnerable to ambush. Even when BMP or BTR armored personnel carriers (APCs) were in support, Soviet infantry once again showed their unwillingness to dismount. Their small arms weapons were outranged by *Mujahedin* Enfield rifles, and Soviet troops were unaccustomed to stalking guerrillas in rugged terrain.[11] Tanks and APCs could not provide fire support to dismounted troops due to restrictions in elevating their main guns, and long-ranged artillery was subject to shifting mountain winds that reduced accuracy.

In response, the Soviets started de-emphasizing tanks. Those that were used often had a motorized rifle squad assigned to protect them against antitank weapons and mines. BMPs also used more cautious tactics, adopting a look-move-look approach, using dismounted squads to bound ahead of the lead platoon in terrain where ambushes were likely. On a higher level, the Soviet Army looked at their experience in Manchuria in 1945 and began employing "enveloping detachments," which were self-contained units of platoon to battalion size that would use more restricted alternate routes to envelope the enemy and strike at his flanks and rear. The use of engineers and mortars was increased to assist in mobility and fire support for these detachments.

Envelopment operations were also conducted by air assault troops in very restricted terrain.

The Soviets developed a recurring theme of attacking "from the top down"; that is, seizing the highest terrain first in order to gain surprise and force the rebels to fight uphill.[12] In a "typical attack," air and ground reconnaissance would check route trafficability and possible ambush sites. Enveloping detachments would take the less accessible routes while the main body would take the most accessible. The enveloping detachment would take the commanding terrain along the main route of advance or to the rear of the enemy. The main body would then complete the encirclement and destruction of the enemy. The use of enveloping detachments was one of the more successful lessons the Soviets learned in Afghanistan.

Logistical problems in mountainous terrain were even greater than tactical ones. Soviet military journals in 1980 documented numerous breakdowns, inadequate preventative maintenance and poor driving skills. Because of the high altitude, consumption rates were 70-90 percent greater for gasoline and 30-40 percent greater for diesel than those in Europe. Helicopter loads were also decreased by 25 percent. To keep the roads open and to guard important LOC points, the army used fortified security posts manned by the Highway Commandant's Service consisting of motorized rifle and combat engineers. Similar troops also made up "movement support detachments" to conduct route reconnaissance, clear mines and obstacles, and repair small sections of road. Despite these efforts, the Soviets still relied heavily on air transport to bring in a large amount of the supplies usually carried on roads, rail and pipelines subject to frequent interdiction by the rebels.[13]

As a result of their mountain warfare experience, the Soviets increased efforts to expand doctrine and training for this area. Military journals showed a steady increase in articles on mountain warfare. Some military districts established mountain warfare training centers for combat and combat support units. Training emphasized independent action below company level, sniper training, overcoming obstacles, mountain climbing and infiltration tactics. Special driver training was provided for wheeled and tracked vehicle operators highlighting vehicle maintenance, ascending and descending steep slopes, and fording streams.[14] Though specialized mountain units have not been identified in the Soviet force structure, at least in open sources, it appears that Soviet combat units committed to such areas will not be caught by surprise by mountainous conditions in the future.

Airpower

Most analysts have described Soviet employment of helicopters as "the most dynamic feature of Soviet tactical operations during the war,"[15] and that the Soviets have learned what the West already knew: "The helicopter is the most important single weapon in counter-guerrilla operations."[16] Though there are analysts who would argue that the Soviets, like the West, were "seduced" by the helicopter (because helicopter mobility gives the illusion that one controls the countryside), the fact that the Soviets gained extensive experience in helicopter employment in Afghanistan is irrefutable. Though the Soviets employed 500-600 helicopters during a peak in 1982, they averaged 250-350 helicopters in-country per year, still more than the average Soviet ground army could expect in normal circumstances. This emphasis on the helicopter was mandated by the vast and difficult terrain, as well as the limited and decentralized nature of later Soviet operations. Given the relatively small number of Soviet troops and their restricted operations in and around well-established garrisons, the helicopter was the only way to exercise initiative and maintain pressure on the *Mujahedin* in the countryside.

Another reason for the reliance on helicopters was the rather lackluster performance of fixed-wing aircraft. Fixed-wing aircraft performed basically two combat missions: strategic bombing and close air support (CAS)/battlefield interdiction. The strategic role consisted of supporting large-scale offensives and high-altitude carpet bombing of guerrilla bases, though there was never a concerted campaign comparable to the U.S. "Rolling Thunder" operations in Vietnam. The medium-range Tu-16 Badger, Su-24 Fencer and, in 1988, the Tu-26 Backfire, performed these missions. Though effective in hitting fixed targets such as cities, they proved to be too inaccurate to hit guerrilla positions. Early in the war the Soviets relied on the MiG-21 Fishbed for CAS, and it proved to be ill-suited for ground attacks in mountain terrain due to its lack of maneuverability. It was replaced by the swing-wing MiG-23/27 Flogger and Su-25 Frogfoot in 1982.

The Frogfoot, whose design was similar to the U.S. Northrop A-9 (unsuccessful competitor to the A-10), proved to be the most effective ground attack aircraft due to its low-speed maneuverability and firepower. The Frogfoot was armed with a Gatling-type cannon, rockets and 4,500 kilograms of bombs. One guerrilla commander in the Panjshir Valley claimed it had "fantastic power."[17] Even so, Soviet pilots often conducted attacks as if they were worried about antiaircraft fire, well before the *Mujahedin* acquired large numbers of hand-held surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). They would drop bombs from 5,000 feet and fire rockets out of range of the target. After the introduction of Stinger and Blowpipe SAMs, pilots would avoid them by simply flying above their roughly five kilometer range.[18] The CAS missions thus fell to the workhorses of the helicopter fleet, the Mi-24 Hind and Mi-8 Hip.

Unlike U.S. Army practice, Soviet helicopters belong to the Soviet Air Force's Frontal Aviation. Ground support is done by attaching one or more air armies to a front-level ground headquarters (two or more ground armies constitute a front). Though this allows for centralized command and efficient utilization of resources, the Afghanistan experience revealed that this did not allow for rapid responsiveness or access to reconnaissance information. Therefore, the Soviets attached Frontal Aviation units directly to 40th Army Headquarters in Kabul.[19] They utilized a number of independent mixed helicopter regiments and squadrons, with some of the squadrons attached down to division level (a practice previously seen in the Western Group of Soviet Forces). Not only was there an attempt for closer air-ground coordination, but Hinds were also used with Su-25s and MiGs as part of a CAS "team," similar to the U.S. Joint Air Attack Team concept.

Tactics originally used by the Hinds could be devastating to the target but left the gunships vulnerable. They often hovered at a low altitude to engage targets or used several gunships in a circular pattern of passes firing 57mm rockets and dropping 250kg cluster and high-explosive bombs from a 1,000 meter altitude. Both the pilots and Hinds initially experienced difficulty using nap-of-the-earth tactics. By late 1980 tactics began to change, most notably with the use of Hinds and Hips in the scout helicopter role. Soviet scouts would stay high and out of range in order to direct attack helicopters. East German Hinds used the Mi-2 Hoplight utility helicopter in the scout role in 1981 in Germany, perhaps demonstrating Afghan lessons.

Because of a large amount of hype, it is difficult to assess the effects of American Stinger and British Blowpipe shoulder-fired SAMs (as well as captured SA-7s and antiaircraft guns) on Soviet air operations. By the spring of 1988, the U.S. government estimated Stinger kills at 250, though other estimates are higher. It is certain that initial losses were high before the Soviets began to develop technical and tactical countermeasures. Technical countermeasures included flare dispensers, infrared jammers and exhaust baffles to reduce passive infrared signatures. Tactical adjustments included flying higher (at the expense of accuracy), flying at night, using the sun to reduce infrared signature, and calling for artillery suppression prior to an operation. A primary tactic was to capture the missiles. KGB-KhAD agents would try to track missile supplies from Pakistan and use *Spetsnaz* forces to launch raids against the sites. This was particularly effective against larger, immobile *Mujahedin* antiaircraft guns like the ZU-23 or Oerlikons.[20]

Because 75-85 percent of Soviet helicopter losses were due to accidents and poor maintenance, perhaps the true effect of *Mujahedin* air defenses on Soviet air operations was giving the Soviets a realistic training environment for their pilots. As one Soviet author stated, "Flying in the mountains and above the desert, plus the possibility of coming under fire by antiaircraft weapons which are making their way from Pakistan to the bandits . . . this is a real training school."[21]

Troop and Equipment Performance

Conducting COIN operations in a tough, Third World environment was a test for both Soviet men and machines. In general, it "demonstrated that there is a wide gap between what is prescribed in Soviet tactical writings and what their units can perform....even after years of fighting the *Mujahedin*, Soviet units continued to fall short of the standards demanded for tactical success."[22] Another analyst stated, "reports from the fighting show repeated failures and mistakes exceeding those of which Western armies are normally capable. The Soviets still seem to fail tactically on the ground despite their improvements and attempts to come to grips with the problems of guerrilla warfare."[23] The primary reason for these problems lies at the weakest point of the Soviet command structure, the inability of noncommissioned officers and junior officers to perform on their own initiative.

COIN requires decentralized command and control. Yet the Soviet command structure, particularly at lower levels, is trained in "cookbook" warfare, where most tactical situations are approached with the same thought process. As previously noted, dismounted tactics, night operations and infiltration techniques require greater leadership than basic motorized combat tactics. However, the Soviet Army did have a high turnover rate for officers, trying to give as many of them "experience" as possible. As many as 60,000 officers had served in Afghanistan by 1986.[24] The end result, in the words of one guerrilla, an ex-Afghan Army officer trained in the Soviet Union, was that the Soviet regular forces were "tactical zeros."[25]

Problems also existed at the troop level. Of these, low morale was one of the most overlooked aspects of troop performance. Soviet troops were two-year conscripts with little training or experience, and they were told that they were going to Afghanistan to fight American, Chinese and Pakistani aggression. It did not take them long to realize this was not the case. "What aggression? This is a complete lie. We couldn't find any evidence of aggression here; only the Afghan people who had taken up arms to defend their country."[26] Low morale led to drug abuse and rampant black market activity. Soviet soldiers often sold pieces of equipment, including weapons, in order to buy hashish. Officers of lieutenant and captain rank usually held the conscripts they commanded in contempt. Only the elite troops such as airborne and *Spetsnaz* had the necessary training and initiative to conduct the COIN operations. The Soviets used these troops almost exclusively in offensive actions against the querrillas in 1988-89. The rest of the Soviet Army was not psychologically suited for COIN warfare.[27]

Some Soviet weapons were equally bad. For all the ballyhoo in the Western press about the simple, rugged reliability of Soviet vehicles, the majority of Soviet equipment losses were due to breakdown, not combat. "There is a lesson of Afghanistan that equipment must correspond to the conditions of the area where the action takes place."[28] Weaknesses in recovery and maintenance from rear services, an area not emphasized for high-tempo combat in the European theater, became woefully apparent. By 1982, the Soviets tried more consistently to recover military material damaged in combat, especially tanks and APCs. The over-reliance on helicopters to perform combat and logistics missions, as well as dust, ice and altitude, caused engines to overheat and break down more often.[29] The Soviets not only learned how their older equipment performed, but they tested a new generation of high-technology small arms, mines, munitions, vehicles and aircraft in order to avoid future problems. Action in Afghanistan reinforced lessons learned in other Third World conflicts from the Arab-Israeli Wars to Africa — a large amount of Soviet equipment is not built to last.

Conclusions

In light of the the Soviet pull-out from Eastern Europe and their new emphasis on defensive doctrine, it is difficult to pinpoint how Afghanistan's lessons will be applied in the future in the Soviet military. Changes in airpower tactics, logistics and weapons systems are probably easiest to transfer to the army as a whole. The results of lessons learned in these areas have shown up already in the Western Group of Forces. Lessons concerning the ability and initiative of Soviet soldiers, as well as the practicality of the army's COIN doctrine, are a different matter.

While there will probably be no rush to "westernize" Soviet training and move towards a more professional army, Soviet "think tanks" and several Soviet officers at all levels have raised the idea of abolishing the present conscript system. The main benefit of Afghanistan seems to have fallen on a new generation of young military "grand masters" like General Lieutenant Boris Gromov, who engineered the withdrawal from Afghanistan.[30] Whether or not the experience of senior and mid-level officers will filter down to the lower ranks remains to be seen. Such a filtering process must compete with the obstacles presented by the huge Soviet military bureaucracy, and the lack of a professional NCO corps to pass on such knowledge is a serious handicap.

The Soviets have apparently made no effort to establish any sort of permanent COIN force or school. It is likely that the Soviets believe that Afghanistan was a special experience, one not to be repeated during the Gorbachev era. In view of its limited goals and forces committed, the military probably believes that no changes in COIN or limited war doctrine are necessary. After all, it may very well have militarily defeated the *Mujahedin* if more ground forces had been committed. Arguably, the Soviets can claim that despite their dismal military performance, their overall political goal was achieved because the Afghan government still stands (an event which probably surprises the Soviets more than the West). The Soviet military performance in the ongoing Armenian-Azerbaijan crisis indicates that LIC doctrine at troop level still translates into the brutality and repression which was so evident in Afghanistan.

Many of the tactical lessons of the conflict will benefit primarily those special forces who carried the brunt of the fighting over its last few years. These troops may prove valuable in putting out the various internal ethnic fires which the Soviets will face in the near future. In total, however, Afghanistan proved that the Soviet Army is ill-suited for employment in a LIC environment. Changes in the Soviet military in the Gorbachev era will determine if it will remain so.

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5 RULES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

by Colonel Donald L. Kerrick

Intelligence means many different things to different people. Likewise, the expected role of the intelligence officer varies from commander to commander. Just what do combat arms commanders expect from their intelligence officers? This year, while attending the National War College at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C., I had the opportunity to discuss this question with many of my classmates. During heated talks I have won some, lost some — and learned a lot. This article shares the observations and thoughts of former combat arms battalion and brigade commanders on what they expect from their "2". Although admittedly a non-scientific survey, there was a consensus on five rules that would be helpful to young intelligence officers striking out on their first assignments. I am sharing those rules along with my personal thoughts for your study and use.

Up Front: A Unanimous View

We intelligence officers are expected to understand our commander and the commander's expectations. Ask your commander if you are not sure you fully understand your guidance. Silence denotes understanding.

Rule 1: Understand your commander's mission, plan and intent. For openers, intelligence officers collect intelligence to help the commander accomplish the mission. Commanders expect intelligence officers to understand thoroughly all missions, plans and tasks — both specified and implied. Apply the commander's intent to those plans and get information that is useful. Don't collect for collection purposes only.

Rule 2: Acquire usable, timely information from the entire intelligence community. This is a most important expectation shared universally by all commanders. Inexperienced intelligence officers often lack the knowledge to harvest timely information from national sources as well as tactical sources. Intelligence officers are expected to be their unit's expert on enemy doctrine and capabilities. Learn the system from top to bottom and exploit it to satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements. Do not allow the "green door" to block useful intelligence from getting to the right place at the right time. Protect sensitive information and sources and sanitize liberally.

Rule 3: Complete a thorough level of analysis. Keep personal and institutional biases out of analysis to avoid giving the commander slanted intelligence. Remember, the commander needs the true intelligence picture — not just the one easiest to swallow.

Rule 4: Provide your estimate of the enemy's intentions. We get high marks on reporting the enemy's capabilities but very low marks on estimating enemy intentions. When the intelligence officer says the enemy has chemical capability and may use it — that's forecasting, not prediction. Concentrate on all facets of the battlefield environment and take a reasoned risk to accurately predict enemy intentions rather than report only capabilities. This rule is tough! Yet, failure to predict or estimate based on sound intelligence and your best judgment is viewed as a shortcoming by many commanders.

Rule 5: Report in the commander's desired manner. Many intelligence officers believe commanders can be kept at arms distance if they are overwhelmed with information. That is the wrong approach. Focus reporting, be brief and provide relevant information in the commander's preferred format.

Summary

In this article I have set forth five general rules for the intelligence officer: know your commander's mission and intent; exploit the entire intelligence community; do proper analysis; try to predict intentions in addition to reporting capabilities; and report in the commander's desired format. Although very basic, they are fundamental to successful intelligence operations. Seasoned intelligence officers will undoubtedly note the similarity between these commander's expectations and the intelligence cycle.

Colonel Donald L. Kerrick received his commission as a second lieutenant upon completion of the Reserve Officer Training Corps curriculum at Florida Southern College. He holds a Masters Degree from the Univ. of Southern California. His military education includes completion of the Armor Officer Basic Course, the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army Fixed Wing Instructor Pilot's Course. Kerrick's previous assignments include a variety of command and staff positions. Prior to commanding the 3d Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation), he served as the Assistant Executive to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. He is presently a student at the National War College.

Message to Military Intelligence Soldiers

Want a real challenge? If you can qualify, you may get a chance to do something different — work in the ever-exciting arena of Army Special Operations! If you think you can qualify — the first step, and it's a giant step, is to go airborne. Soldiers of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command must be able to deploy on short notice around the world. Airborne training is not for the faint at heart. It is guaranteed to be some of the most challenging and demanding training you will ever undergo. Meet the challenge and join the silent warriors of the Special Operations Command.

Although the bulk of the Special Operations soldiers is stationed at Fort Bragg, N.C., these soldiers are also stationed and train worldwide. Special Operations offers MI soldiers a unique opportunity to serve their country.

Special Operations has openings for airborne qualified soldiers (and those willing to undergo airborne training) in nearly all MI MOSs. Be on the cutting edge! Come and be one of the chosen few, the proud who wear the coveted maroon beret and the distinctive silver jump wings of an airborne soldier. Army Special Operations has shortages in the following MOSs:

96B: SFC, SGT, SPC
96D: SFC, SSG, SGT
96F: MSG, SGT, SPC
97B: MSG, SFC, SGT, SPC
97E: SFC, SGT, SPC
97G: SSG, SGT
98C: SFC, SGT, SPC
98G: SSG, SGT, SPC
98H: SFC, SGT
98Z: MSG

Be Special, see your local personnel officer today!

VAN DEMAN

by Captain Michael E. Bigelow

Among the remarkable characters that dot the history of American military intelligence is Major General Ralph Van Deman, the "father of military intelligence." Throughout his 38-year career, he alternated between troop duty and intelligence work. In the process, he became the Army's most experienced intelligence officer. During World War I, he organized America's first complete intelligence system, bringing American military intelligence into the 20th century.

Early Career

Van Deman was born in Ohio in 1865. After graduating from Harvard in 1888, he attended both law and medical school. He received an infantry commission in 1891 but was allowed to complete medical school. Entering the Army in 1893, he served a year with troops then attended the Infantry and Cavalry School (forerunner of the present-day Command and General Staff College) at Fort Leavenworth. In July 1897, Lieutenant Van Deman was posted to his first intelligence assignment — the mapping section of the Army's Military Information Division (MID).

Organized in 1885, MID collected both military and topographic information on potential enemies. From 1892-1898, MID prospered as it focused its efforts on Cuba. As a result, the Army entered the Spanish-American War with an accurate picture of Spanish defenses in Cuba. President William McKinley himself praised MID's work.

Van Deman played an important part in MID's effort. In 1898, he debriefed Frederick Funston, an American who had served with Cuban guerrillas fighting the Spanish, gaining valuable information. Once the war began, Van Deman was one of only two MID officers who remained in Washington. He and Captain Willis Scherer published and distributed maps and intelligence pamphlets on Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines.

The Philippines

After the Spanish-American War, Van Deman took a break from intelligence work and served as an aide to Brigadier General Robert Hughes, a departmental commander in the Philippines. In 1901 Van Deman was ordered to help establish a military intelligence division for the Philippines and soon became its head.

Using a network of "information" officers, Van Deman's section conducted mapping operations and area studies. This information was consolidated and sent to the Army's MID in Washington. He also collected combat intelligence against the Filipino insurgents. In one case, his agents uncovered a plot to seize Manila and kill Major General Arthur MacArthur, the military governor of the islands. With this information, the Americans were able to thwart the plot.

In the Philippines, Van Deman had his first opportunity to conduct counterintelligence operations. A large part of this effort was directed against the insurgents' intelligence gathering. He didn't, however, limit himself to countering this threat. He foiled several Japanese attempts to gain information in the Philippines.

In late 1902, Van Deman returned to the United States infantry. He served as a company and battalion commander and then graduated as a member of the first War College class. He returned to the Philippines in 1905 with his infantry regiment and later was involved in a covert mapping project in China.

The Second Division

In 1907, Van Deman returned to intelligence work in Washington but to a different organization — the Second Division of the General Staff. In 1903, the Army's General Staff had been created. It consisted of three numbered divisions. The First Division dealt with administrative matters. The Second collected military information. The Third was concerned with the War College.

Shortly after Van Deman returned to Washington, the Third Division moved to Washington Barracks on the outskirts of the city. Once there, the War College realized that it badly needed the maps and files of the Second Division (MID) to function. Brigadier General William Wotherspoon, the War College president, recommended that the Second Division move to Washington Barracks as well. Van Deman and his MID colleagues protested the move. While it would benefit the Third Division, they argued that the move would limit access to MID's information for the rest of the War Department. Moreover, they feared that the Second Division would lose its independence.

Despite the protests, Major General Franklin Bell, the Army Chief of Staff, ordered the Second Division to move. Within a few months, the Second Division was merged with the Third Division to form the Second Section. The War College dominated the new section and the collection of intelligence suffered.

A frustrated Van Deman served in the new Second Section for two more years. Although he continued to press for more intelligence production, his pleas went unheeded. Bitterly, he catalogued the large number of maps that had accumulated.

In 1910, he returned to the Philippines' MID where he was once more involved in the mapping of China. With intelligence work curtailed at the national level, this project was conducted exclusively under the direction of the local MID.

From 1912-1915, Van Deman held a variety of regimental and divisional staff duties in the United States. Then, in May 1915, Van Deman, now a major, was reassigned to the General Staff in Washington.

Re-emergence of Military Intelligence

When Van Deman returned to Washington, he discovered that intelligence work was being ignored. Reports from military attaches on the nine-month-old war in Europe were scanned and filed but not distributed. More disturbing, the reports from the Punitive Expedition into Mexico were simply piled on a table unread. Van Deman immediately campaigned for a more suitable intelligence organization. In a series of memorandums, he argued for the re-establishment of the Military Information Division on the General Staff. The most important of these recommendations was his "Historical Sketch" of March 1916. The hard-hitting "Sketch" outlined the history of military intelligence since 1885 and gave a superb analysis of the need for an independent and equal intelligence section. Brigadier General M. M. Macomb, Van Deman's immediate superior, approved the recommendations. Unfortunately, the Chief of Staff, Hugh Scott, rejected them.

In early 1916, Macomb's successor, Brigadier General Joseph E. Kuhn, with Van Deman, took steps to correct the problems. He cancelled a War College class so that the officers could study the vast amount of incoming information instead. He then started a program to train National Guard officers for intelligence work. Most important, though, Kuhn allowed Van Deman to use his initiative within this new framework for intelligence. Van Deman not only re-established an Army intelligence section, but he also created a framework for a national intelligence agency. He worked with civil agencies that had a collection function, such as the State Department. Moreover, he and Kuhn persuaded Newton Baker, the Secretary of War, to obtain $1 million to support intelligence contingencies.

With this, the Army once again had a functioning intelligence apparatus. However, it was still nothing more than a departmental sub-section when the United States entered World War I in 1917.

Military Intelligence Section

In April 1917, with the permission of Kuhn, Van Deman approached Scott about establishing an intelligence service. Scott remained unconvinced. He believed that America could rely on the already established British and French intelligence systems. After two or three interviews, Scott ordered Van Deman to cease his efforts for a separate intelligence agency and not to approach Secretary Baker on the subject.

Van Deman, however, was not so easily stopped. He believed so strongly in the need for a separate intelligence service that he found "other methods." He was detailed to escort a well-known woman novelist to some military installations near Washington. To his surprise, he found the woman knowledgeable in the importance of intelligence. He quickly explained that U.S. Army had no intelligence service and that the Chief of Staff had stopped the attempts to create one. She promised to bring the matter to Baker's attention.

About a week earlier, Van Deman had found that Baker ate breakfast at the same club as the chief of police. Van Deman, who knew the chief, asked him to explain the situation to the secretary. The chief did.

These "other methods" worked. Baker had Van Deman report to his office. After a half-hour conversation, Baker told Van Deman that within 48 hours, a military intelligence service would be established. On May 3, 1917, the Military Intelligence Section was created with Van Deman as its first chief.

World War I

Once created, the duties of Van Deman's organization grew quickly. From the War College he inherited the map and photographic files and the attache system. He was assigned responsibility for the security of War Department offices in Washington. His section maintained the war maps in the White House and Congress. He also gained responsibility for countersabotage and counterespionage. He created a cryptographic section and the Corps of Intelligence Police. And on top of all this, Van Deman had responsibility for the traditional collecting, managing and disseminating of intelligence.

As the section's duties grew so did its size. When first established, the section consisted of only three officers and two clerks. Eighteen months later, the Military Intelligence Division contained nearly 1,700 personnel.

To organize his section, Van Deman relied on the British design. The section had two major branches: Negative and Positive. The Negative Branch included activities that prevented the enemy from gaining intelligence about America. The Positive Branch included the efforts to gain information about Germany. Under these two branches, there were twelve sub-sections.

Van Deman was primarily concerned with counterintelligence, since the American forces in France were in a better position to gather intelligence on the enemy. With several incidents of sabotage and a threat of espionage, security was a real problem. Van Deman established a variety of Army-wide security measures including identification cards, alert guards and personnel investigation systems. He helped organize the American Protective League, a counterespionage citizen association.

In June 1918, Colonel Van Deman was ordered to France as the replacement for the American Expeditionary Force's G2, Colonel Dennis Nolan. However, the war ended before he could replace Nolan.

Post-War and Retirement

Immediately after the war, Van Deman was the senior American intelligence officer and headed Allied counterintelligence for the Paris Peace Conference. During the next ten months, he developed a deep distrust of communists that stemmed from their subversion attempts against American forces. In August 1919, he returned to America. Over the next ten years, he commanded a regiment, brigade and division. In 1929, he was promoted to major general. A few months later he retired.

Obsessed with American security and driven by ardent patriotism, Van Deman remained involved in intelligence. He helped make military maps of California but more important, he kept files on "subversives."

Apparently working with the support of the Navy, War Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Van Deman operated a private intelligence network. This network was primarily aimed at combating communist subversion. Supplied by a nationwide informant system, Van Deman developed card files of over 100,000 entries. His files included a library of photographs, communist literature and information reports. He shared this information with federal and local agencies.

After December 1941, Van Deman was an unofficial "advisor" to the War Department. While the details of his duties are unclear, he received a Legion of Merit for the collection and evaluation of intelligence from 1941 to 1946.

Six years later, after a lifetime of intelligence work, Ralph Van Deman died at the age of 86.

The zenith of Van Deman's career came during World War I when he fought for and organized the Military Intelligence Division. It was the first complete intelligence agency that coordinated all available assets at the national level. This organization also was the forebear of many modern intelligence agencies. In short, Van Deman created an organization that led American military intelligence into the 20th century.

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S2 PERFORMANCE TRENDS:
Perspective of a Former Observer/Controller

By Captain Carlos Gonzalez

I was an intelligence system observer/controller (O/C) at the National Training Center (NTC). Thirty-nine rotations have shown me the good, the bad and the ugly of intelligence support to tactical operations. I saw 40 S2s; three were captains, 36 were first lieutenants, and one was a second lieutenant who took over for an injured first lieutenant during mid-rotation. While there were a few individuals who did not excel, the majority of these young MI officers did their best to provide what was expected of them. Quite a few did extremely well given their experience level.

What Makes a Good S2

A good S2, at the NTC or anywhere else, is one who orchestrates the intelligence process, develops the products and provides the support necessary to accomplish the mission. He or she must have a thorough understanding of the intelligence system and its relationship and applicability to the other battlefield operating systems. An S2 must understand the threat in terms of organization, equipment and tactical doctrine. A good S2 must also understand friendly organization, equipment and tactical doctrine. The intelligence products as identified through the IPB process must be developed and integrated to support the commander's concept of operation and scheme of maneuver for a given mission.

How well did the units integrate the support provided by the S2 into the decision making process for each mission? One of the things that can be said about NTC, without any fear of exaggeration, is that it has spotlighted intelligence at the battalion and brigade level. Intelligence has always been a key combat multiplier. History repeatedly shows intelligence used to leverage combat power. If a unit goes to the NTC and does not understand that intelligence forms the basis for all tactical planning, it will soon learn. Those of you who have been at the NTC and gone through the formal brigade/battalion after action review (AAR) process as an S2, know the pressure of the spotlight. When S2s perform well, the units learn quickly the importance of integrating their support and products into the decision making process. There is nothing more embarrassing for a commander or S3 than to maneuver the unit and lose the unit's combat power in a kill zone that had previously been identified by the S2.

> ***"When S2s perform well, the units learn quickly the importance of integrating their support and products into the decision making process."***

What are some of the problems faced by battalion S2s at the NTC? The basic problem is inexperience. Surprisingly, that inexperience pertains primarily to friendly operations. As I said, to be a good S2 you have to understand friendly operations. How else can the S2 develop the necessary products to support the mission? How well can an S2 relate enemy courses of action to friendly courses of action? Understanding friendly organization, equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures will further the understanding of the threat. How often is an S2 given the opportunity to observe a threat formation maneuver? How often does an S2 see threat equipment operate (move, shoot, communicate)? How well can an S2 develop a situational template when he has no practical understanding of the consideration given to enemy combat system battlefield positioning?

Reconnaissance and Surveillance

Additional problems faced by the S2s relate to reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) and counterreconnaissance planning. S2s failed to use and integrate all available assets into the R&S effort. The common trend at the NTC was to over-task the scout platoon with collection requirements. This resulted, more often than not, in the late initiation of R&S operations and in some missions, no R&S effort at all.

S2s did not consider all enemy courses of action (COA) in their R&S plan. They tended to limit their R&S requirements to what they believed to be the most probable enemy COA. By limiting their R&S operations to the most probable enemy COA, they were limiting their ability or flexibility to redirect the R&S assets once a COA was denied. As an example, I'll use an R&S in support of a task force conducting a deliberate attack. The S2's enemy situation map reflected both confirmed and suspected enemy motorized rifle platoon positions. The northern motorized rifle company within the task force zone and where the main effort was directed, was templated proposing a forward slope defense. Named areas of interest (NAI) were identified and used to direct the focus of the R&S assets to confirm the forward slope defense. No NAIs were identified to redirect the R&S assets to look for a reverse slope defense if the forward slope was denied. A good R&S plan should be one that addresses all enemy COAs. It must include on-order and follow-on tasking and requirements (NAIs) developed to determine the true enemy situation.

S2s' R&S plans were not developed to support the scheme of maneuver. This particular problem had a direct correlation to the inexperience demonstrated by some S2s in terms of understanding friendly operations. Not understanding the informational needs of a unit related to the type of operation (hasty attack, deliberate attack, movement to contact, etc.) being conducted was the major factor contributing to weak R&S planning and execution.

Counterreconnaissance

Although counterreconnaissance is a maneuver (S3) function, the S2 role in its planning is critical. It is not surprising to see S2s finding themselves responsible for counterreconnaissance battle.

At the NTC, the basic problem in counterreconnaissance planning and execution was the lack of an integrated and coordinated effort throughout the task force sector. Units thought they had a good counterreconnaissance plan when they positioned a force forward of the main battle area during defensive operations. But by not integrating that force with a task force-wide effort, the results were a counterreconnaissance effort that did not facilitate target acquisition, target hand off and target destruction throughout the depth of the sector.

Another weakness in counterreconnaissance planning dealt with having a predetermined force designated as a counterreconnaissance element. Units came to the NTC with a company team designated as the counterreconnaissance force. This, in principle, reflected good prior planning. But to deploy that company team, mission after mission, in a counterreconnaissance role without regard for the threat, the enemy situation, and analysis of the terrain was nothing more than a waste of manpower and equipment.

Is There Hope?

Has there been an improvement in the quality of MI officers graduating from the MIOBC? From my observations at the NTC, I would say yes. The MIOBC students today are receiving much more detailed instruction than what some of us "old timers" received. Is it enough? No. Can it be improved? Yes. Unit commanders, platoon leaders or supervisors must understand that courses taught at the Branch school are limited by resources. If a unit wants a good officer, then the unit must provide that officer the opportunity to learn and to grow.

Thanks to the NTC and the other Combat Training Centers, the role of the S2 in support of tactical operations at battalion and brigade has reached new levels of understanding. An S2 is required to understand the method of operation of a threat force. To do that he must have a good understanding of the method of operation of his own force. There is no other branch in the Army that requires so much of its junior officers. And there is no other job in the Army that provides the satisfaction and sense of accomplishment than that of an S2 doing well at the NTC.

Captain Carlos Gonzalez is an instructor/writer with the Tactical Intelligence Task Group, Department of Tactics, Intelligence and Military Science. He just recently completed a tour at the National Training Center as the Mechanized Infantry TF S2 Trainer.

TOTAL FORCE

By Colonel Joseph T. Mesch

The Advanced Course

One of the surest ways for an officer in the Reserve Components to be discharged (kicked out) is to fail to complete the Advanced Course. Military education requirements are necessary for an officer to be promoted. An RC officer will not be promoted to major unless a completion certificate for an Advanced Course is in the officer's file.

About 35 percent of Military Intelligence captains are not selected for promotion due to not completing the Advanced Course. Two such nonselections result in discharge. No matter how good you are, the board will not even consider you without the education requirement. Therefore, a successful RC MI officer should get started on the MI Advanced Course as soon as he or she becomes a first lieutenant.

There are two ways for an MI officer to complete the MI Advanced Course:

1. Join your Compo 1 peers on active duty.
2. Take the RC configured version in 2 week increments.

Both versions are offered here at Fort Huachuca, the home of Military Intelligence.

The AC Version or "Five Months in the High Desert"

The Intelligence School welcomes MI slotted RC officers to attend the MI Officer Advanced Course here at Fort Huachuca. The course is divided into two phases:

1. The All Source Tactical Intelligence Common Core —10 weeks.
2. A Track including G2 Work Station — 10 weeks.

Soldiers can choose from three tracks: 1. Imagery Exploitation — 35C, 2. Counterintelligence — 35E, 3. Electronic Warfare — 35G.

MI soldiers who want to take a particular track should discuss this choice with their intelligence staff element. If in doubt call me at Fort Huachuca (AV 821-1176).

Since most soldiers are already in a 35D slot, requirements should be considered in a broad perspective for the unit to have a balanced intelligence team.

Intelligence Transition Course

Any RC MI soldier who has completed the MI Officer Basic Course is eligible (with completed special background investigation) to attend the AC MI Advanced Course in residence. There are many non-MI officers who are moving to MI units that continue to expand in the RC. These soldiers need to become MI Branch qualified prior to attending the MI Advanced Course. Therefore, they must complete the nine week MI Officer Tactical Intelligence-Transition Course. This qualifies them in the 35D specialty. This 35D specialty is also awarded to lieutenants completing the MI Officer Basic Course.

The Intelligence School has not developed an RC configured version of this course since no demand has been articulated. Guard Bureau is currently reviewing the issue. If you have comments on this requirement, please contact Major Dave Miner at AV 286-7645 or (703) 746-7645.

RC Version or What I did Last Summer

If you just cannot get away from your civilian job for some six months, or you're still trying to win the lottery, then the RC MI Advanced Course is for you. The Intelligence School reconfigured the course to mobilization tasks required for an MI officer. The RC Intelligence School or Intelligence Training Army Area School (ITAAS) provides the summer instruction for this course here at Fort Huachuca. You can complete the course in 13 months and receive an Intelligence School diploma and a 35D specialty.

The RC MI Advanced Course is divided into three phases:

Phase 1. Company Command Module — two weeks. This resident module develops an RC officer to be a successful MI leader.

Phase 2. Correspondence Module (a) Army common, (b) MI specific.

Phase 3. Intelligence Operations Module — two weeks. This resident module develops an RC officer to be a successful MI staffer.

To Track or Not to Track

Most units and commands are thrilled to get a branch qualified MI officer and will expect a great deal from this soldier. So tracking after the RC Advanced Course is not always necessary. This philosophy, plus time constraints are the reasons the Intelligence School separated the tracks from the requirement to complete the Advanced Course. This also permits an RC MI officer to complete the Advanced Course in a reasonable time and to be eligible for promotion to field grade.

If you do decide to track to 35C, 35E or 35G, you can do so by attending two resident phases of two weeks and a correspondence phase. RC officers should complete the MI Advanced Course prior to taking one of the tracks. Exceptions are permitted if the officer has completed the MI Officer Basic Course.

A Friend at Fort Huachuca

If you need any more details on your personal situation concerning the MI Advanced Course, feel free to contact Major Kloor, a Reserve full-timer, AV 821-2085 or (602) 533-2085.

Bottom Line

To be branch qualified, eligible for promotion to major and to enjoy a successful RC career, enroll and complete the MI Advanced Course.

Conferences

Mark your daytimers, alert your leaders and plan to participate:

- Army Guard Intelligence Conference, 18-21 October 1990, 50th AD of Fort Dix, N.J. will host. This will be an historic joint Compo 1/Compo 3 session with the Reserve MI battalions meeting with the guard division G2s. Major General Paul Menoher, the MI proponent will be keynote speaker.
- RC MI Advisory Committee, November 25, 1990, Fort Huachuca. This meeting will be held in conjunction with the MI Worldwide Conference.
- G2/MI Commanders Worldwide Conference, 26-29 November 1990 at Fort Huachuca. One day of this session will be devoted to RC issues and a report out from the Fort Dix October session.
- RC General Officer MI Orientation, 11-13 April 1991, Fort Huachuca. Participants will include Guard division commanders, respective state AGs and ARCOM commanders responsible for MI battalions. The theme will be Airland Battle future.

Colonel Joseph T. Mesch is the Reserve Forces Advisor to the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. Previous AGR assignments include HQDA, the Pentagon; First U.S. Army, Fort Meade and ARPERCEN, St. Louis.

(Continued from page 5)

for MI in the 21st Century" (April-June 1990). Davis understands that the non-tactical MI role has been there all along and will continue at an enhanced pace in the future. Enemies of this country don't necessarily come with full battle dress. Regardless of their makeup, we must be prepared and capable of identifying our enemies in order to defeat them. This job is not training, it is here and now and Army Military Intelligence personnel have a significant role to play.

I believe the time is long overdue for Military Intelligence to educate the Army and promotion board members that a large number of MI officers are not just getting ready to fight, they are actively engaged. Their OERs don't look like conventional Infantry OERs because they have a different mission. We are not involved in war games. MI operations continue when the war goes from hot to cold to mutual cooperation. If we in the real-world intelligence business fail our job, those who are getting ready to fight may be prepared for the wrong war.

Lieutenant Colonel James H. Thomas
Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command
St. Louis, Mo.

TRAINING NOTES

GET ON THE SAME WAVELENGTH

by James G. Patterson

You've spent a lot of time working on your lesson plan. You know your subject and you know how to teach. In fact, you've delivered this kind of training before, and the class loved it! About 20 minutes into the class, you realize you just aren't connecting with your students. No matter what you try, nothing seems to work.

What happened? You might blame a few unruly students, or maybe it was a bad time of day. Perhaps you didn't really feel up to it. That might explain your problem. But, I have another explanation. Maybe you were trying to communicate with students who learn using different styles than you do!

Learning style differences might indeed explain why a carefully crafted lesson plan worked for one group of students and didn't for another. A good instructor understands all learners don't have the same kind of brain. Understanding individual differences, instructors will try a variety of methods to teach the same thing. I believe a good lesson plan will allow for individual differences. It's similar to something I teach in a basic speech class: know your audience and speak to and for your audience, not just for yourself. Do you remember the feeling you had when it was obvious you connected with a student? That's a good example of communicating on that person's wavelength.

There is a body of research that supports individual differences in learning and communicating. In the 1920's, the Swiss psychoanalyst Carl Jung said people develop and use a primary behavior style. Although we communicate and learn primarily through one style, we do, over the course of time, tend to use a blend of styles.

"There is a body of research that supports individual differences in learning and communicating."

People like Jung and American psychologist Paul Mok, said that people can behave, communicate and learn using four styles: Intuitor, Thinker, Feeler and Sensor.

What are the characteristics of these styles? What are the best ways to train these people?

The Intuitor

Intuitors are often offended by restricted or highly structured training. Generally, they feel they're being treated like children when they have to submit to step-by-step instructions. These people are original, imaginative, creative, charismatic, idealistic and ideological. On the negative side, these people might also be called unrealistic, out-of-reach, out-of-touch or impractical. How can you tailor your message to intuitors? Brigham Young Univ. education researcher Lane D. Ward advises trainers to try group discussions, democratic involvement, case studies, interactive video, lectures, role-playing — anything to allow these people to discover on their own.

The Thinker

Thinkers believe the only really relevant learning is "on-the-job." Classroom situations are considered foreign to their "real-world" environment. Thinkers also tend to have difficulty transferring skills from one area to another. Thinkers might be described as deliberative, proper, conservative, objective, analytical and as weighing alternatives. They can also be called verbose, indecisive, over-serious and rigid. How can you connect with these folks? Ward advises hands-on experiences, on-the-job training, coaching and job-specific simulations.

The Feeler

Feelers believe that there is more than one method to produce the same results. They demand a voice in decisions that affect them. You can describe feelers as empathetic, probing, introspective, loyal, spontaneous, warm, friendly and talkative. Some negative characteristics might include impulsive, manipulative, guilt-ridden and subjective. Your training will be more successful with "feelers" if you can clearly identify their objectives. The feelers will then reach the objectives in their own way. When given the freedom to do so, these people like to prove themselves. Successful training methods include team building exercises, interpersonal games, individualized instruction and participant presentation.

The Sensor

Sensors are very time-efficient. They want programs that are fast paced and void of any "warm and fuzzy" human relations activities. Don't put these people through team-building or getting acquainted exercises; that's just a waste of time for them. These people are realists. They are pragmatic, assertive, result-oriented, competitive and competent. On the negative side, they may be arrogant, domineering, lack trust in others, have short-range thinking and act without thinking. According to Ward, the best training design for "realists" is straightforward and based on facts. They like structured, programmed instruction with explicit goals and well-defined outcomes.

Putting it Together

Now let's put this information on learning and communicating styles into action. You're trying to connect with a student or group of students. You also know that you can increase the chances of reaching people by tailoring your message to their particular primary style. So, for the primary "intuitor" you might say, "How do you react to the basic concepts presented here?" You can rephrase that question for a thinker by saying, "Based on your own analysis, how are the facts I've presented relevant?" For feelers you might say, "How do you feel about what we've discussed?" And for the sensor, you say, "I hope I haven't bored you; what's your reaction to my main point?"

Knowing that we don't all learn and communicate in the same way can be of great value to you, the trainer. With a little practice, you'll understand the style differences in students and use a variety of teaching methods to get on their wavelength. This is expecially important to use when groups show more than one strong learning style. You can also discover what your primary style is — it's probably related to your favorite teaching method! But, keep in mind that your favorite teaching method may not be the best way to reach your students. Using methods that might conflict with your style doesn't come automatically. It will take work until you get comfortable using another style, but it is worth the effort. There are dangers in thinking that you can neatly fit every student into a rigid style cubbyhole. Remember, while people tend to use a primary style they also use, for short periods of time, a variety of styles. Consciously try to reach students "where they are, and not where you are." As a result, I bet you'll experience far fewer groans and a lot higher marks on those student evaluations.

"Knowing that we don't all learn and communicate in the same way can be of great value to you, the trainer."

I've only presented the basics on understanding individual differences in learning and communicating. If you want more information on this subject (including some easy ways to use questionnaires designed to discover these styles), I suggest you look at Carl Jung's book, **Psychological Types**; David Kolb's, **Learning Styles Inventory** (Boston: McBer and Company, 1977); Hagberg and Leider in **The Inventurers** (Reading, Penn.: Addison and Wesley, 1978); and **Cognitive Style, Learning Style, and Transfer Skill Acquisition** (Ohio State Univ., 1979).

Jim Patterson is an education specialist with the Communicative Skills Office, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. He is an active writer and speaker on business communications and marketing.

CAREER NOTES

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PRE-COMMAND COURSE

Effective FY 91, **all** MI Pre-Command Course (PCC) training will take place at Fort Huachuca. Based on guidance from TRADOC, the PCC dates for FY 91 are as follows:

Class Number	Report Date	Start Date	End Date
91-002	15 Oct 90	16 Oct 90	26 Oct 90
91-004	14 Jan 91	15 Jan 91	25 Jan 91
91-006	25 Feb 91	26 Feb 91	8 Mar 91
91-009	6 May 91	7 May 91	17 May 91

Beginning in FY 91, MI PCC will have six 1/2 days of common core followed by two days of echelon corps and below and echelon above corps tracks.

All officers are required to attend branch PCC before attending the one week PCC at Fort Leavenworth. MI officers going to tactical units will also attend a two week Tactical Commanders Development Course (TCDC) at Fort Leavenworth.

POC for MI PCC is Mr. Welsh, 602 538-0750/0751 or AV 879-0750/0751.

PROFESSIONAL READING

Asian Policy — The New Soviet Challenge in the Pacific by Robert A. Manning, N.Y.: Priority Press Publications, 1988, 103 pages, $12.95.

The 1990's have been touted as the decade of the Pacific. Interested in expanding your knowledge about the Pacific Basin and the new, emerging role of the Soviet Union in East Asia? Then read this book. Manning, a recognized expert in Asian affairs, uses broad brush strokes to paint an interesting, thought provoking portrait of the Soviet Union's new role in Asia and the consequences this role will have upon American strategic interests in the region. He has produced a concise and well written book that warrants the time and attention of professional military readers.

The Soviet Union is a Eurasian power — inextricably part of both the European and Asian strategic equation. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev clearly recognizes the significance of the increasingly intertwined geopolitical configuration between Asia and Europe. **Asian Policy — The New Soviet Challenge in the Pacific** explains Gorbachev's recent efforts to project a more conciliatory and benign-appearing approach to Asia that is resulting in what Manning believes to be a sharp decline in the perception of the Soviet threat in the Pacific. Manning describes how over the past decade, aggressive Soviet behavior has served to project a negative image and has isolated Moscow in the Pacific. The reduction of this threat perception may ultimately impact upon the fate and shape of U.S. presence in the Pacific.

"The Soviet Union is a Eurasian power — inextricably part of both the European and Asian strategic equation."

Describing Gorbachev's approach to Asia as a "pattern of bold diplomatic demarches punctuated with Soviet concessions," Manning presents Sino-Soviet rapprochement as the key to the new Soviet policy in Asia. He discusses a number of Soviet concessions — the Soviet unilateral territorial concession regarding the Sino-Soviet border along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers; the withdrawal of one Soviet division from Mongolia; and proposed bilateral talks aimed at establishing a lower level of troops along the Sino-Soviet border. He believes Gorbachev's new policy in Asia focuses on linking the Soviet economy to the West and linking the development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East to the economy of the region. In this vein, Moscow is pursuing stronger economic ties not only with the People's Republic of China but also with South Korea; nations comprising ASEAN (the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Brunei); and a number of small island states in the Western Pacific.

Despite some territorial concessions and pursuits of economic cooperation, Manning zeroes in on the ambiguities in the "new" Soviet foreign policy for Asia. Most notably, he says that Moscow has neither significantly reduced its military posture in Asia nor has it abandoned any of its commitments (with the exception of Afghanistan). Manning advocates the Soviets have indeed gained acceptance as a legitimate participant in the economic and political arena of the Pacific Basin, but he hesitates to anticipate just how long this new Soviet role will continue to be played out.

As Manning correctly points out, the new Soviet approach to the Pacific Basin is complicating the political and economic arenas and altering threat perceptions among U.S. friends and allies in the region. The consistent thread in U.S. policy in the Pacific has been an emphasis on maintaining a balance of power in Asia to prevent the rise of any hegemonic force. If the U.S. is to maintain its own predominant position in the Pacific, it must fathom new dynamics of the region and adjust American policy accordingly. The critical question to be answered is will the heretofore U.S. patchwork alliance system in the Pacific survive amidst the new flux of increasing Soviet interest? Manning promotes that it will; but indicates that for the current system to survive, the United States must make creative adjustments to its current policy in the region.

Captain Len Kosakowski
Fort Meade, Md.

Death in the Desert: The Namibian Tragedy by Morgan Norval, Washington, D.C.: Selous Foundation Press, 1989.

This book will provide insight into how a successful counterinsurgency can be waged and shows that sound military strategy will always defeat an enemy. Those who are interested in counterinsurgency and Southern Africa will find this book invaluable. Norval has done an excellent job of detailing the South African operations in Namibia and Angola. His expose of Cuban involvement and support for the communist guerrillas in Angola and the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) helps the reader to grasp the complexities of that war. The description of how the South Africans were capable of adapting their intelligence networks and reconnaissance to meet the changing tactics of the SWAPO inside Namibia and Angola are truly remarkable.

Namibia gained its independence in March 1990, ending more than a century of outside rule; first by Germany and then by South Africa. It also ended 28 years of a bloody civil war that is the main topic of this book. Beginning in 1962, SWAPO had waged a guerrilla war against the South African Defense Forces from within Namibia and sanctuary in Angola. Most of the action took place in the northern third of the country. A new dimension appeared in 1975 when the Portuguese withdrew from Angola and civil war also broke out in that country. By December 1975, there were over 7,000 Cuban troops in Angola; by March 1976 over 12,000 Cubans were fighting the Western-backed guerrillas. The Cubans began to support the SWAPO; and South Africa, in an attempt to bolster Western-oriented guerrilla groups in Angola and destroy the logistical base of the SWAPO, invaded and then occupied part of Angola.

".... South Africans were capable of adapting their intelligence networks and reconnaissance to meet the changing tactics of the SWAPO inside Namibia and Angola...."

Although SWAPO's war against South Africa peaked in effectiveness in the late 1970's, South Africa began to think seriously about withdrawal only in the late 1980's. The loss of lives and the escalating cost of the border war came at a time when South Africa was also experiencing an economic decline. Mikhail Gorbachev and Fidel Castro also decided they were no longer interested in playing major destabilizing roles in Southern Africa. The Cuban casualties had started to grow dramatically as the South African army dealt them blow after blow.

American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, who for eight long years had attempted to extricate Namibia from South Africa, finally was able to broker a successful cease-fire. In December 1988, he was able to get a three-way accord negotiated among Angola, Cuba and South Africa which called for Cuban and South African withdrawal from Angola and Namibian independence. The United Nations supervised the transition and monitored the crucial elections in November 1989.

First Lieutenant Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF
Alexandria, Va.

Security Awareness in the 1980's edited by Lynn F. Fischer, Richmond Va.: Security Awareness Division, Educational Programs Department, Department of Defense Security Institute, 1989, 205 pages, $11.00 though Government Printing Office.

If there is a single piece of literature that should be read by personnel who routinely handle classified materials, this book is it. It should be mandatory reading for all security managers, military or civilian. The text makes it worth going out of one's way to get a copy. The stories are true, have appeared prominently in the media, and are told here in fascinating detail. This book should be eagerly read by clerks, secretaries, supervisors and others who normally get nauseous when security is mentioned but who are usually in the best positions to detect faulty security in its embryonic stages.

As a generalization, American defense agencies, military services and civilian contractors do not handle operational security (OPSEC) very well at the organizational level. Americans lead very private and individualistic lives and have great difficulty "snitching" on others in the work area who display classic signs of being a risk to national security. With the perceived pervasive over-classification of information, many Americans who handle sensitive information are inured to not treating all classified documents as "real" secrets. An inevitable outcome of these and other factors has been an unprecedented rash of cases of sensational espionage against the United States over the past decade.

"As a generalization, American defense agencies, military services and civilian contractors do not handle operational security (OPSEC) very well at the organizational level."

Security managers need to do a better job, the concept of security needs better support within organizations that handle classified materials, and workers need a greater consciousness of security if the United States is to protect itself against the predations of malevolent individuals and groups such as the John Walker spy ring. An important element in this is education that will raise security awareness in the workplace. This does not mean more mind-numbing mandatory mass lectures from the security officer, but the utilization of a wider and more diverse array of tools.

This book is a *very* good tool. It is a compilation and editing of articles that have appeared over the past decade in the Department of Defense Security Institute ***Security Awareness Bulletin***. It is arguably the best, most complete and most readable collection of official spy stories yet produced in the United States.

Major William H. Burgess, III
Fort Bragg, N.C.

The Military Experience in the Age of Reason by Christopher Duffy, N.Y.: Atheneum, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987, 346 pages, $24.95.

Most students of military history are familiar with the period of warfare beginning with Napoleon and leading to the present day. But, few know about the 18th century's style of war. If you have any interest in this period of warfare, or want to learn, this book is the place to start. Duffy has established himself as an expert on this era, having published several other books on the period, and it's obvious he put his knowledge to good use in this work.

In many ways the roots of our modern study of war lie with the commanders, thinkers and writers of the 18th century. This was the age of Frederick the Great, Marshal Maurice de Saxe and George Washington. It was a time of professional armies that for the first time used firepower to dominate the battlefield. It was the final century of the "Age of Reason," and military commanders studied war and made serious attempts to professionalize their officer corps.

The mass armies of the 19th century, to which we directly trace modern warfare, had yet to evolve. Yet, even the armies of Napoleon and U.S. Grant owed a debt to those who organized and took a scientific approach to the development of artillery and a study of the military art.

What makes Duffy's book interesting is that it's not a reevaluation or study of the philosophical military writings of the period. What he does is examine warfare of the 18th century as it was actually fought, using mostly first person sources.

Duffy approached the subject with three questions in mind. First, what was it about the 18th-century military profession that was peculiar to individual nations? Second, what was common to the military experience in all times? Third, what, by process of elimination, was characteristic of 18th-century armies in general?

In answering these questions, Duffy divided his book into three parts covering "The Armies of the Enlightenment," a look at army organization, training and background; "War," or what the reality was on the battlefield; and "The

"One period book for officers advised, 'Dancing is most necessary for the man of good education and for the officer.' "

Military Experience in Context and Perspective," which covers the civilian view of the military at the time and where the soldier fit in after leaving his regiment.

A serious reading of the book also allows you to glean lessons for today. During the "Battle" chapter Duffy discusses the effects of the "firefight." It's obvious that even in the 18th century there was a direct relationship between training and a soldier's actions on the battlefield. Also, despite the control exercised by the officers, discipline could break down under fire. For example, battalions of the period were trained to fire in a nice, organized manner. However, once the shooting started, and they were actually facing an enemy that shot back, fire discipline disappeared and, "the troops blazed away at will." According to Duffy, the Prussians and Hanoverians were embarrassed by this, but at least two French officers recognized the reality and recommended that commanders take advantage of the situation.

Not all of the book's examples are serious. One period book for officers advised, "Dancing is most necessary for the man of good education and for the officer. It makes him acceptable or even indispensable at parties when he relaxes in his off-duty hours. It is good for the officer to betake himself to such assemblies, and especially the mixed companies attended by ladies and pretty girls, which are an education for all persons of the male sex."

Major Raymond W. Levesque
La Paz, Bolivia

The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa (Second Edition) edited by David E. Long and Bernard Reich, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, 479 pages, $55.00.

This book will not appeal to the general reader. However, it is worth consulting for those seeking a better understanding of the political affairs of this crucial region. Maps and current events aside, the political analyses provide the student of this troubled corner of the world a much greater appreciation for the complexities of the region.

The Middle East and North Africa are of only recent interest to the United States. Once the domain of the European colonial powers, political affairs in this part of the world became prominent in Washington during the opening moves of the Cold War in the late 1940's. The emergence of the independent state of Israel and the ensuing Arab-Israeli conflicts focussed even greater attention on the region. Finally, the emergence of independent states with their hands on the West's oil spigot firmly grasped the attention of policy makers and the average citizen in the 1970's.

The importance of the Middle East on world affairs cannot be appreciated without understanding the political dynamics of the countries which constitute this very volatile region. A scholarly interpretation of this region's politics is provided in this collection of essays covering the 21 countries which constitute what we know as the Middle East and the African countries which border the Mediterranean and Red Seas. The authors are experts on the region from the academic world and the American foreign policy establishment.

The only inherent weakness of the book, which should come as no surprise, is its "up-to-dateness." In a region as politically volatile as the Middle East, it is impossible to remain current in a work of this nature. Some of the future prospects in the analyses still hold up despite the recent changes in the region. The essay on Iran, for example, notes that after Ayatollah Khomeini's death, Iran will face difficult times without a strong leader. Other attempts at predicting future trends are less successful. In the chapter on the Palestinians, the author states that "despite the radicalization of many (West Bank Palestinians) and the potential for increasing violence in the years to come, strong pragmatism and adaptability continue to characterize their day-to-day attitudes." The *Intifada*, or uprising, which began two years ago among the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip took many regional observers, the author of this essay among them, by surprise and has yet to be resolved.

Captain Robert E. Kells, Jr.
Parsonsburg, Md.

To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy by Jorge I. Dominguez, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1989, $35.00.

Fidel Castro doesn't like the United States. This book explores the global implications of that simple statement. For us, the book raises two questions. First, in light of improved East-West relations, how long can Castro maintain his adversarial relationship with the United States? Secondly, can Castro's brand of socialism survive without anti-Americanism?

Dominguez begins by defining the principles which guide Cuban foreign policy. Since Castro enjoys unchallenged leadership in Cuba, a search for guiding principles inevitably becomes a search for Castro's motives. Understand Castro, and you understand the policy.

Dominguez does not analyze in-depth the origins of Castro's anti-Americanism, but he points out that it existed at an early stage of his political development. In a letter written before he had any close ties to the Cuban Communist Party or allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, Castro wrote: "I have sworn that the Americans will pay very dearly for what they are doing. When this war is over, a much longer and bigger war will begin for me: the war that I will make against them. I realize that this is my true destiny." This letter long pre-dates both the U.S. quarrel with Castro and his association with the Soviet Union. Deeply rooted in Cuban nationalism and the desire for radical change, anti-Americanism is central to Castro's ideology.

The perceived need for a shield against the U.S. threat was the impetus behind the Cuban-Soviet alliance which developed during 1959-1960. U.S. willingness to compromise with Castro ended in 1960 when President Eisenhower authorized the overthrow of the Cuban government. Thus, Cuban policy towards the United States and the Soviet Union was well established by 1961, the year Castro announced that he was a Marxist-Leninist and that his revolution was socialist.

Dominguez convincingly argues that genuine conviction often motivates Cuban support for revolutionary movements and states. Rather than merely serving as a Soviet surrogate, Cuba has taken the leading role in Grenada, Nicaragua and Angola. That these involvements are looked upon favorably by the Soviet Union and unfavorably by the United States is a secondary benefit.

Pragmatism, as well as hostility, has a place in Cuban relations with the United States. Routine cooperation occurs in some technical areas and certain tacit understandings occur. These understandings and areas of cooperation serve to reduce world tension and Dominguez argues that they can and should be developed further by the two parties. He concludes that Castro's Cuba and the United States will never be friends, yet there is much to respect on both sides.

Richard Marx
Fairbault, Minn.

The Dark Summer by Gene Smith, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987, 314 pages.

I would like to think of Gene Smith's work as a cut-down, much easier to read version of William Shirer's **The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich**, except that Smith doesn't go into all of the details of Hitler's youth and the actual conduct of World War II.

Smith focuses on the 1935-1939 period and outlines the diplomatic maneuvering between England, Germany, the Soviet Union, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria which led to the eventful day of September 1, 1939 and the outbreak of war. **The Dark Summer** describes the shock of failure of the diplomatic corps at successfully avoiding this conflict which ended in the deaths of over 50 million persons worldwide. Much is made of Neville Chamberlain and his famous 1938 Munich meeting with Hitler which allegedly resulted in "peace in our time."

Probably the most important lesson raised out of this book is that a nation's trust should not be solely in the prowess of its diplomats but also in the continued training and state of readiness of its military forces. As Clausewitz is famous for saying: "War is but a continuation of diplomacy." Our nation's diplomats and leaders would do well to heed the lessons reviewed in this book.

Captain Eric K. Naeseth
Annapolis, Md.

107th
Military Intelligence Battalion

A silver color metal and enamel device 1-3/16 inches in height overall, consisting of the shield of the coat of arms in proper colors. Attached below the shield a silver scroll inscribed THROUGH KNOWLEDGE VICTORY in blue letters.

Oriental blue and silver gray (white) are the colors traditionally associated with Military Intelligence units. The ermine background is a heraldic fur and alludes to a cloak symbolizing a "cloak of secrecy" and the covert activities of an intelligence organization. The fret is composed of interlaced parts showing the complexity and interconnections of intelligence information. It resembles a puzzle to be solved by finding the proper key or part, an allusion to the Military Intelligence mission. The bayonet signifies readiness and response. The lightning flash symbolizes the radio communications and electronics employed to make the unit prepared and effective.

The 107th Military Intelligence Battalion was constituted on June 1, 1983 in the Regular Army, assigned to the 7th Infantry Division, and activated at Fort Ord, Calif. The 601st Army Security Agency Company and the 7th Military Intelligence Company were concurrently reorganized and redesignated as Companies A and B.

The 601st was constituted on March 19, 1951 in the Regular Army as the 601st Communication Reconnaissance Detachment. It was activated in April 1951 and inactivated in August 1956 at Fort Jay, N.Y. It was redesignated in April 1967 as the 601st Army Security Agency Detachment and activated at Fort Hood, Texas. It was deactivated in November 1968 in Vietnam. On September 21, 1978 it was redesignated as the 601st Army Security Agency Company and activated at Fort Ord, Calif.

The 7th MI Company was constituted July 12, 1944 in the Army of the United States as the 7th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. It was activated in August 1944 at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii and inactivated in April 1946 in Korea. It was activated again in December 1946 in Korea and inactivated in March 1947 in Korea. In October 1950 it was activated in Korea and allotted on February 1954 to the Regular Army. The detachment was reorganized and redesignated in May 1959 as the 7th MI Detachment. In June 1971 it was inactivated in Korea. It was activated in January 1976 at Fort Ord, Calif. On July 21, 1978 the detachment was reorganized and redesignated as the 7th MI Company and assigned to the 7th Infantry Division.

Company A is entitled to campaign participation credit for the Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase III; the Tet Counteroffensive; and Counteroffensive, Phases IV, V and VI. Company A is entitled to the Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army) and streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967-1968. Company B is entitled to campaign participation credit for World War II Leyte and Ryukyus; Korean War UN Offensive; CCF Intervention; First UN Counteroffensive; CCF Spring Offensive; UN, Summer-Fall Offensive; Second Korean Winter; Korea, Summer-Fall 1952; Third Korean Winter; and Korea, Summer 1953. Company B is entitled to Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), streamer embroidered KOREA, the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, and streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 1944 TO 4 JULY 1945.

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School
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